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CLOSING THE GATES
There is no war between the Constitution and common sense. *
Uno absurdo dato, infinita sequuntur. **
I. INTRODUCTION
Seven years ago, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. ar-
gued for a calculated shift in perspective by those concerned with
the protection of individual rights and liberties.1 Noting that
"[ulnder the banner of the vague, undefined notions of equity,
comity and federalism the Court has condoned both isolated and
systematic violations of civil liberties,"2 Justice Brennan sug-
gested that state courts and state constitutions might prove more
hospitable for those seeking the types of protections that were
once routinely secured under the federal Bill of Rights.3
In the intervening years the frequency with which the Court
has issued rulings similar to those that provoked Justice Bren-
nan's original criticisms has, if anything, increased, and scrutiny of
the Court's decisions in certain volatile areas has intensified.4 This
has been particularly true when the Court has been called upon to
refine and reshape the parameters of the fourth amendment's
guarantees against "unreasonable searches and seizures." 5
* Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
•* "One absurdity being allowed, an infinity follows." 1 E. COKE, INSTrrTUEs OF
THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 102 (1628), quoted in, Grano, Rethinking the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 Am. CRim. L. REV. 603, 603 (1982).
1. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977).
2. Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
3. Justice Brennan advocated presentation of both federal and state claims: "I
suggest to the bar that, although in the past it may have been safe for counsel
to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be
most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional questions."
Id. This may prove unworkable in light of Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469
(1983), within which the Court indicated that it would decline review on the
basis of an "adequate and independent state ground" only if that ground was,
on its face, the exclusive basis for the lower court's holding. Id. at 3476. See
infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
4. For example, because of pervasive national concerns about the widespread
distribution and use of controlled substances, Court criminal procedure rul-
ings involving drugs have been subjected to intense scrutiny. Various mem-
bers of the Court have argued that fourth amendment guarantees must be
reexamined in light of the drug problem. In Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319
(1983), Justice Blackmun argued that police conduct in an airport drug profile
detention "should not be subjected to a requirement of probable cause." Id.
at 1332 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice Douglas observed, however, it
is important to recall that fourth amendment rules must protect both "the
innocent and the guilty alike." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314
(1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
5. The fourth amendment states:
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Two themes have permeated the majority of the Court's recent
fourth amendment rulings. The first has been a willingness to re-
strict the scope and application of the amendment's guarantees. 6
During its most recent Term, for example, the Court utilized Illi-
nois v. Gates7 as a vehicle for substantially reshaping the affidavit
requirements for issuance of search warrants.8 In Gates, the Court
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of fourth amend-
ment guarantees within our democratic system of government. Justice Jack-
son's statement in his dissenting opinion in Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160 (1949), has become a frequently cited benchmark:
[Fourth amendment rights] are not mere second class rights but be-
long in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations
of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the
spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncon-
trolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weap-
ons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government.
Id. at 180 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
It appears that this perspective is not shared by a majority of the current
Court, particularly in light of the perception that far too many criminals are
being set free on "technicalities" that bear no relation to ultimate guilt. See
infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,462-63 (1981) (warrantless search of
container within passenger area of automobile permissible if arrestee law-
fully arrested while in automobile); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108
(1980) (individual challenging search must prove legitimate expectation of
privacy in area searched or article seized); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148
(1978) (no standing to challenge search of third person's residence or prop-
erty); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (reasonable suspicion,
rather than probable cause, as standard for investigatory detention). See gen-
erally Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L.
RaV. 335 (1978).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2317, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983). Justice Rehnquist wrote the
majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mun, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice White issued a concurring opinion. Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, as did Justice Stevens,
joined by Justice Brennan, on different grounds.
8. The narrow issue before the Court was "the application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of a partially
corroborated anonymous informant's tip." Id. at 2321. The Court's holding,
however, arguably sets a standard for assessment of probable cause for all
warrant applications. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
It should be noted that a limited number of state courts initially argued
that the revised Gates standard did not expressly repudiate the Aguilar-
Spinelli standard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 390 Mass. 562, 458
N.E.2d 717 (1983), rev'd sub nom. Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085
(1984). As the Court made clear in its per curiam reversal, however, Gates
"did not merely refine or qualify the 'two-pronged test' [but] rejected it as
[Vol. 63:514
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adopted a "totality of circumstances" approach in the evaluation of
warrant affidavits, 9 expressly overruling the standards that had
prevailed under the "two-pronged" test articulated in Aguilar v.
Texas'0 and refined in Spinelli v. United States."
A second, and potentially more troubling trend has been the
Court's failure to achieve a working consensus in some of its most
important fourth amendment cases.1 2 Recently, in what many had
hypertechnical and divorced from 'the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.'" Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2087 (1984) (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)). In doing so, the Court stressed the clear
language of Gates indicating that it "is wiser to abandon" Aguilar and
Spinelli. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
9. The revised standard states that:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, com-
mon-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowl-
edge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
10. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
11. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Under the Aguilar-Spinelli approach, information se-
cured from an informant was deemed reliable only if "the magistrate [was]
informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
[reached his conclusions] and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be
disclosed.., was 'credible' or his information 'reliable."' Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (citations omitted). However, where "allegations...
contain no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves...
they are not endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informer's
tip." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969). Accordingly:
[iun the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the
information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip de-
scribe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the
magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substan-
tial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusa-
tion based merely on an individual's general reputation.
Id. at 416 (emphasis added). By adopting a "totality of circumstances" stan-
dard, the Court has removed any requirement that the affidavit meet mini-
mum objective standards. See infra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
12. During the October, 1983 Term the Court issued full opinions in nine search
and seizure cases, none of which produced a unanimous judgment. All nine
cases involved prosecutions for possession or distribution of drugs or narcot-
ics, and in each the government had appealed an adverse judgment below.
In two, Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983) (plain view doctrine), and
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983) (illegal airport detention invalidated
subsequent luggage search), the Court was unable to fashion a majority opin-
ion. Four produced sharply worded dissents that vividly illustrated the
profound disagreements regarding the scope of fourth amendment protec-
tions that have split the Court: Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983) (sus-
tains protective detention and attendant automobile search); Illinois v.
Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983) (sustains initial container search and con-
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hoped would be an important ruling dealing with drug courier
profiles, airport stops and detentions, and warrantless searches of
airline passenger's luggage, the Court failed to reach a consensus
on anything other than the result.13 And, while the Court has re-
treated temporarily from its avowed intent to reshape the contro-
versial "exclusionary rule,"' 4 its docket for the current Term
leaves little doubt that those Justices who have sought the oppor-
tunity to restrict the scope of that rule will have ample opportunity
to do So. 15
trolled delivery); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573 (1983)
(search of vessel permitted incident to documents inspection); Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983) (affidavit requirements for issuance of search
warrant). In three, United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637 (1983) (airport de-
tention of luggage and "sniff test" for drugs sustained; length of detention
exceeded permissible limits); Illinois v. LaFayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983) (in-
ventory search of personal effects incidental to arrest sustained); and United
States v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983) (electronic beepers do not invade
fourth amendment privacy expectations), the Court issued a total of six con-
curring opinions.
This pattern of fragmented decisionmaking is illustrative of the tenden-
cies that have, on occasion, led the Court itself to admit that "it would be
nonsense to pretend that our decision today reduces Fourth Amendment law
to complete order and harmony." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
483 (1971). Moreover, the Court's inability to fashion a binding consensus is
not confined to fourth amendment jurisprudence. See generally Note, Plural-
ity Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L REV. 1127 (1981).
13. Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983).
14. The rule, formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and made
applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), requires the ex-
clusion in a criminal trial of evidence gathered in violation of the fourth
amendment. It has generated considerable controversy during recent years,
and various Justices have indicated their desire to abolish the rule or to con-
siderably restrict its scope and application. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317, 2340-47 (1983) (White, J., concurring); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 437, 443-44 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387, 413-14 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring); Bivens v. Six Unnamed Narcotics
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See generally 1
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIzURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT
§ 1.2 (1978 & Supp. 1983); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1974); Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974); McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L.
REV. 659 (1972); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO.
L.J. 365 (1981); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970).
15. The focal point in much of the current debate about the rule is the belief that
there should be a "good faith" exception, allowing the introduction of evi-
dence that police have obtained when operating under a sincere belief that
their conduct was consistent with fourth amendment guarantees. After ask-
ing the parties in Gates to brief this issue, 103 S. Ct. 436 (1982), and a reargu-
ment focusing upon it, the Court refused to rule on the point, stating that
"[tihe State never, however, raised or addressed the question whether the
[Vol. 63:514
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently demonstrated
its willingness to follow the lead of its federal counterpart when
assessing claims that the procedural and substantive rights of
criminal defendants have been violated.' 6 This tendency to accept
doctrines that have substantially reshaped criminal procedure was
most recently demonstrated in State v. Arnold, 7 where the court
incorporated, without having been requested to do so,18 and with
federal exclusionary rule should be modified in any respect, and none of the
opinions of the Illinois courts give any indication that the question was con-
sidered." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2323 (1983).
In his concurring opinion in Gates, Justice White took exception with the
Court's refusal to reach the question and set out a detailed justification for
adopting the good faith exception. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2336-47
(1983) (White, J., concurring). Certiorari has been granted in two cases that
directly raise the question, United States v. Leon, 701 F.2d 187 (9th Cir.) (war-
rant issued, but information from informants found not to be credible or relia-
ble), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983), and Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 387
Mass. 488, 441 N.E.2d 725 (1982) (warrant failed to describe objects to be
seized), cert. granted, 103 U.S. 3534 (1983). Certiorari was granted in a third
case, Coloradc v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (warrantless police action), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 3535 (1983). The writ has, however, been dismissed, "it
appearing that the respondent died on November 27, 1983." 104 S. Ct. 543
(1983). The dismissal was apparently issued over the objections of the State
of Colorado, which sought to have the case argued and decided in spite of
Quintero's death. This tenacity reflects the eagerness with which opponents
of the exclusionary rule have sought opportunities to modify or eliminate it.
At the same time, Quintero was perhaps the most significant of the three
good faith cases to be argued. Those wishing to see the Court finally come
directly to grips with the "good faith" exception have good cause to be disap-
pointed by the dismissal, particularly since the Court has held that it will
hear cases arguably moot where the constitutional issues posed are impor-
tant, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973), or capable of repetition but evading
review. So. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498,
515 (1911).
The pairing of the Gates "totality of circumstances" test for probable
cause determinations and a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule
would almost certainly radically alter the balance in criminal investigations
in favor of the police.
16. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 213 Neb. 900, 331 N.W.2d 819 (1983) (adopting New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)); State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 299 N.W.2d
421 (1980) (adopting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)); State v. Smith, 207
Neb. 263, 298 N.W.2d 162 (1980) (adopting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980)); State v. Brewer, 190 Neb. 667, 212 N.W.2d 90 (1973) (adopting Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). One commentator has observed that
"[almong the fifty states, there is today an unhealthy kind of attention given
to the decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court." Collins, Re-
liance on State Constitutions-Away from a Reactionary Approach, 9 HAs-
TINGS CONsT. L.Q. 1, 16-17 (1981).
17. 214 Neb. 769, 336 N.W.2d 97 (1983).
18. Gates was decided on June 9, 1983; Arnold on July 1, 1983. The Brief for Ap-
pellant in Arnold was filed with the court on October 7, 1982, and that of the
Appellee on February 3, 1983. Both parties confined their analysis of the case
to an application of previous tests, and neither urged that the court in any
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little real comment, the "totality of circumstances" test enunciated
in Gates.19 In this particular instance, however, the absorption
into Nebraska law of the revised federal standard provoked sharp
criticism from two members of the court, who suggested that
"rather than blindly allowing the 'continuing evisceration of
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures,'... we adopt a standard based on the Nebraska Consti-
tution and offer such protection as we may in the courts of
Nebraska."
20
It is upon this aspect of the Arnold decision, the availability and
desirability of a specific Nebraska standard, that this Article will
focus. In particular, the Article will examine carefully the facts
and holdings in both Arnold and Gates, contrasting the manner in
which the respective courts treated the facts and their analysis of
applicable legal doctrines. It will then explore the validity of Judge
White's 2 1 criticisms in Arnold, demonstrating both that the general
tenants of his concurring opinion are well founded, and that seri-
ous flaws exist in the Gates Court's analysis and its holding. Fi-
nally, the Article will argue for the adoption of an alternate
standard governing searches and seizures in Nebraska that is
based solely upon the guarantees of the Nebraska Constitution.
22
way alter the approach that had prevailed under the Aguilar/Spinelli formu-
lation, as adopted by the Nebraska court in State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 384,
176 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1970). See generally Brief for Appellant and Brief for Ap-
pellee, State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 336 N.W.2d 97 (1983).
19. The majority found that "[the affidavit's] sufficiency is even more obvious
under the totality of the circumstances test established by Illinois v. Gates,
[103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)]." State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100
(1983). It should be noted that, one week prior to Arnold, Judge Caporale
discussed Gates in a one-judge opinion issued pursuant to the provisions of
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-824 (Cum. Supp. 1982). State v. Brennan, 214 Neb. 734,
738-40, 336 N.W.2d 79, 82-85 (1983). Section 29-824 permits the State to appeal
from an order suppressing evidence, and provides for a summary review by
one judge of the court. One judge opinions are, however, dispositive only of
the factual question before the judge and have no precedental value.
The court has since utilized the revised standard adopted in Arnold on at
least two occasions. See State v. Gilreath, 215 Neb. 466, 468-69, 339 N.W.2d 288,
291 (1983); State v. Williams, 214 Neb. 923, 928, 336 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1983).
20. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775-76, 336 N.W.2d 97, 101 (1983) (White, J., con-
curring) (citations omitted). Judge Shanahan joined Judge White in this
opinion.
21. Opinions issued by both Judge C. Thomas White of the Nebraska Supreme
Court and Associate Justice Byron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court are discussed extensively in this Article. Every effort has been made
to indicate which individual authored the opinion being examined. Where
not otherwise clear from the context, however, it should be understood that
references to Judge White refer to Judge C. Thomas White, and those to Jus-
tice White refer to Justice Byron White.
22. The applicable provision of the Nebraska Constitution provides that:
[Vol. 63:514
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Much of the analysis will focus upon the question of what re-
quirements should govern the issuance of a warrant where the affi-
davit relies, at least in part, upon information secured from
informants.23 Nevertheless, the basic premises and analytic meth-
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or afftrmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
NEB. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
The language of art. L, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution mirrors that of the
fourth amendment. The Nebraska court has held, however, that decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States construing the fourth amendment
are neither controlling nor necessarily binding in the construction of art. I,
§ 7. Billings v. State, 109 Neb. 596, 603, 191 N.W. 721, 723 (1923). In Billings the
court refused to adopt the exclusionary rule as formulated in Weeks, a posi-
tion to which it adhered until Mapp forced a reversal. State v. O'Kelly, 175
Neb. 798, 804, 124 N.W.2d 211, 215 (1963); State v. Goff, 174 Neb. 548, 553, 118
N.W.2d 625, 629 (1962); State v. Easter, 174 Neb. 412, 421-22, 118 N.W.2d 515, 521
(1962). These rulings, however, did not alter the Billings premise that art. I,
§ 7, has independent force.
23. The court's initial analysis in Arnold appears to have focused upon the suffi-
ciency of the information secured from an informant who has engaged in a
controlled purchase of drugs. See infra note 46. This poses a more narrow
issue than would have been present had the affidavit detailed only the infor-
mation provided by the initial informants.
At least three "types" of informants can be distinguished for the purposes
of probable cause determinations. The first is the "concerned citizen." The
Nebraska Supreme Court has held that information secured from concerned
citizens is presumptively reliable. State v. Ybanez, 210 Neb. 42,44, 313 N.W.2d
30, 31 (1981); State v. Butler, 207 Neb. 760, 763-64, 301 N.W.2d 332, 334-35 (1981);
State v. King, 207 Neb. 270,275, 298 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1980) (one judge opinion).
The second type of informant is the "confidential" informant, whose infor-
mation may be deemed reliable if it meets the requirements outlined inAgui-
lar and Spinelli. See supra note 11.
Finally, there is the "anonymous" informant, whose identity is unknown.
It has been argued that the anonymous informant is presumptively unrelia-
ble, Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Recon-
ciling the Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 Am. Crim. L. REV.
99, 107 (1982), and that information from such a source should be subjected to
a more rigorous evaluation. There is some support for this position in Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ('This is a stronger case than obtains in
the case of an anonymous telephone tip."). Prior to its ruling in Gates, how-
ever, the Court had not directly addressed the questions posed when infor-
mation in a warrant had been secured from an anonymous source. See infra
notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
Professor LaFave has examined in considerable detail the traditional ra-
tionales for requiring that informant tips meet rigorous probable cause stan-
dards. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 14, at § 3.3. Professor Livermore has,
however, argued that "no real explanation has shown why informers are pre-
sumptively untruthful or what factors make an individual an informer," and
that "the argument that has dominated scholarly analysis of the Draper-
Spinelli problem-that the ability to conceive an innocent or venal possibil-
1984]
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ods will have general applicability, and the standard advanced will
carry implications for the majority of instances where Nebraska
courts must examine claims that the admission of evidence in a
criminal proceeding should be barred as a result of the protections
embodied in the Nebraska Constitution.
24
ity defeats probable cause-seems plainly inappropriate." Livermore, The
Draper-Spinelli Problem, 21 A=uz. L. REV. 945, 946, 958 (1979).
24. The debate about the application of state constitutional guarantees in crimi-
nal proceedings is not limited to fourth amendment situations. Similar ques-
tions have been raised in fifth and sixth amendment cases. In Nebraska, for
example, Judge White has argued that "[i]t may well be necessary, in view of
the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court which have considerably weakened
the once absolute strictures of Miranda, for this court ... to formulate, as
have a number of the states, a state constitutional basis to deal with police
conduct violative of Miranda." State v. Favero, 213 Neb. 718, 724, 331 N.W.2d
259, 263 (1983) (one judge opinion).
Many commentators have argued that the rulings of the Burger Court
have created a need for stricter criminal procedure standards based upon
state constitutions. See, e.g., Handler, Expounding the State Constitution, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 202 (1983); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights
in the Days of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); Walinski & Tucker,
Expectations of Privacy: Fourth Amendment Legitimacy Through State
Law, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1981); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure Revisited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Wilkes, The New Federalism Revisited ]; Wilkes, More on the New Federalism
in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L. J. 421
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilkes, The New Federalism]; Project Report, To-
ward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HAIV. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 271
(1973); Developments in the Law--The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
But see Grano, Perplexing Questions about Three Basic Fourth Amend-
ment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause, and the Warrant
Requirement, 69 J. Camx. L. & CRmiNoLoGy 425 (1978); Israel, Criminal Proce-
dure, The Burger Court; And the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MicH. L. REv.
1320 (1977). Professor Grano argues, for example, that the characterization of
the Burger Court as "an uncompromising champion of law enforcement in-
terests is incorrect." Grano, supra, at 425.
Professor Kamisar, by way of contrast, has asserted that there are "two"
Burger Courts, one that initially dealt "heavy blows to the Fourth Amend-
ment," and a second that has been far less disposed to dismantle the legacy
of the Warren Court. Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded ?), the Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution-Oriented?), and Po-
lice Investigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REvoLu-
TION THAT WASN'T (V. Blasi ed. 1983). Professor Kanisar's conclusion that
"the Burger Court's hostility to its predecessor's police practices rulings
seems to have subsided," id. at 91, is debatable, and in the specific instance of
the warrant requirement, was reached without the benefit of having the
Gates ruling before him.
Regardless of how one interprets the rulings of the Burger Court, it is im-
portant to emphasize that state courts must respond to such rulings in a prin-
cipled fashion. Professor Collins, for example, has argued convincingly that
"a reactionary approach [that] uses the state charter in a piecemeal fashion
[Vol. 63:514
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H. THE ARNOLD DECISION
A. The,4rnold Facts
On January 26, 1982, Officer Joseph Nepodal of the Omaha
police requested a warrant to search two Omaha addresses and
certain vehicles for "marijuana, and records, money, or other items
used in the distribution of controlled substances."25 Some of the
information in the affidavit had been secured from informants;26
other elements were obtained from an independent police
investigation.
2 7
Specifically, in March, 1981, a group of "concerned citizens" met
with Omaha police28 and brought to their attention various pieces
of information about alleged narcotics activities in the area of
Thirty-fourth and Decatur Streets in Omaha.2 9 This initial infor-
mation was supplemented in January, 1982, by a telephone call
from an unidentified informant who stated that a particular indi-
vidual, one "Ross," was selling marijuana in that same area.30
Acting upon these pieces of information, Officer Nepodal initi-
•.. for the purposes of philosophical disagreement or in order to insulate a
controversial decision from Supreme Court review... [treats] the sovereign
law of state constitution[s] [as] little more than a plaything." Collins, supra
note 16, at 13-14. Professor Collins makes this point while criticizing those
courts that have sought to evade Burger Court decisions. This same perspec-
tive should, however, apply in those instances where state courts have dis-
played excessive deference to Supreme Court rulings.
25. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 772, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983).
26. Information secured from informants presents certain dangers distinct from
the normal problems associated with hearsay testimony. See infra note 220
and accompanying text. Courts have distinguished at least three types of in-
formants, and the legal tests applicable to information from each were, prior
to Gates, distinguishable. See supra note 23.
27. The principle that police may utilize information from an informant as the
starting point for an investigation is well established.
28. Brief for Appellee at 5.
29. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 770, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983). The information
included two addresses, one of which was subsequently identified as the Rob-
ert Ross residence, and a license plate number that was also registered to
Ross. Brief for Appellee at 5. While incorrect in some ways, the information
received from the "concerned citizens" was, in large part, verified by subse-
quent police investigations. Id. Unlike the situation in Gates, the details ob-
tained from informants and presented to the court in the affidavit requesting
the warrant detailed expressly criminal activities. See infra notes 96-123 and
accompanying text.
30. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 770-71, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983). The identity of
this informant was not revealed, and there is nothing in the record to indicate
that this information would, standing alone, have met the requirements set
forth in Aguilar and Spinelli. See supra note 11. This tip would not have
provided sufficient basis for issuing a warrant. However, it constituted only a
small portion of the information relayed in the affidavit, and was corroborated
by the ensuing investigation.
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ated in January, 1982, a "controlled purchase"3 ' of marijuana by an
unidentified informant at the North 34th Street address.32 During
the purchase, the informant learned that larger quantities of mari-
juana might be purchased from "Cisco," and was given a telephone
number that proved to be listed to a Sheryl Ross residing at the
same address. 33 The informant was also told that purchases of
larger quantities of marijuana would require "Cisco" to leave the
North 34th Street residence and secure the marijuana elsewhere.34
A second controlled purchase at the North 34th Street address
followed, during which an individual, subsequently identified as
Robert Ross, left that house.35 Ross was followed to 6915 North
24th Street, which he entered, and from which he returned to his
residence. Shortly afterwards, the informant emerged, gave the
police a quantity of marijuana, and indicated that Ross had had to
leave the original house to secure it.36 Further investigation re-
vealed that the defendant, Marcia C. Arnold, about whom Nepodal
had received past information indicating involvement in the distri-
bution of controlled substances, resided at the second address.3 7
On January 26, 1982, an affidavit and application for a search
31. The Nebraska Supreme Court has recognized the validity of a "controlled
purchase" as an investigative tool and has defined that term as "a purchase of
controlled substances by a cooperating individual from a specific designated
person or at a specific designated place, made under the personal supervision
and control of an officer or officers." State v. Payne, 201 Neb. 665, 669, 271
N.W.2d 350, 352 (1978). Judge White dissented in Payne, arguing that the defi-
nition of a "controlled buy" had been established only at the suppression
hearing and had not been before the magistrate when the warrant was is-
sued. Id. at 674, 271 N.W.2d at 355 (White, J. dissenting). Judge White noted
with apparent approval the procedure outlined in Jones v. United States, 336
A.2d 535 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975), which involved a careful search of the inform-
ant prior to the purchase to insure that he was not already carrying the con-
traband. This procedure was apparently not followed by the police in Arnold,
a fact noted by the Appellant. Brief for Appellant at 4. However, neither the
court in its decision nor Judge White in his concurring opinion addressed this
issue.
32. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 669, 771, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983).
33. Id. It was subsequently determined that "Cisco" was, in fact, Robert Ross.
Id. at 772, 336 N.W.2d at 99.
34. Id. at 771, 336 N.W.2d at 98.
35. Id. at 771, 336 N.W.2d at 99.
36. Id. at 771-72, 336 N.W.2d at 98-99.
37. Id. at 771-72, 336 N.W.2d at 99. Appellant argued that Nepodal's previous in-
formation regarding Arnold was a "bald assertion not corroborated by any
reliable information and similar to the statement made [and rejected] in
Spinelli wherein the suspect was purportedly a 'known gambler'." Brief for
Appellant at 12. Even had the court explicitly accepted this contention, how-
ever, it is likely that it would have found sufficient other detail to sustain the




warrant were filed in the Omaha Municipal Court.3 8 A warrant au-
thorizing a search of both residences was issued and served the
same day.3 9 During the search of the Arnold residence the officers
found eighty-two tablets of a substance later identified as LSD,40
and thirty dollars that were determined to be part of the money
from the earlier controlled purchases at the North 34th Street resi-
dence.41 Arnold subsequently admitted that the LSD belonged to
her and that Ross had given her $800 to purchase two pounds of
marijuana.42
On May 13, 1982, after trial to the court without a jury, Arnold
was convicted of possession of a controlled substance, LSD.43 Ar-
nold appealed her conviction, assigning as error the District
Court's denial of her request that certain evidence obtained from
the execution of a search warrant be suppressed.44
38. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 770, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983).
39. Id. at 772-73, 336 N.W.2d at 99.
40. Id. at 773, 336 N.W.2d at 99. There appears to have been some dispute regard-
ing the contraband that the officers discovered in the Arnold residence. In
her brief, Appellant declared that the police 'found no marijuana, nor any
instruments or records of manufacture of marijuana, but only a limited quan-
tity of LSD which had never been mentioned previously." Brief for Appellant
at 5. The state, on the other hand, contended that "[t]he officers found a few
dime bags of marijuana at the residence." Brief for Appellee at 3. Arnold was
arrested and charged only for possession of the LSD. State v. Arnold, 214
Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983). Assuming that the warrant was valid,
both the evidence and the charge were proper:.
When officers, in the course of a bona fide effort to execute a valid
search warrant, discover articles which, although not included in the
warrant, are reasonably identifiable as contraband, they may seize
them whether they are initially in plain sight or come into plain sight
subsequently as a result of the officers' efforts.
State v. Waits, 185 Neb. 780, 787, 178 N.W.2d 774, 779 (1970) (quoting Skelton v.
Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 144, 460 P.2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1969)). See also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971); State v. King, 207 Neb.
270, 277-78, 298 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1980) (one judge opinion).
41. The presence of these funds in Arnold's purse was noted by the court, State
v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983), and does not appear to
have been contested by the Appellant, who made no mention of this fact in
her brief.
42. Id. at 772-73, 336 N.W.2d at 99. The court does not appear to key its holding
upon these admissions, and it is likely that Arnold's conviction would have
been sustained even had these statements not been made.
43. Id. at 770, 336 N.W.2d at 98.
44. Id. at 773, 336 N.W.2d at 99. The court's decision does not indicate the exact
basis for the appeal, noting only that "[t] he contention is that the affidavit for
the search warrant was insufficient." Id. at 770, 336 N.W.2d at 98.
Appellant argued that probable cause had not been established within the
parameters of Aguilar and Spinelli: "[The affidavit] neither informed the
magistrate of how the informant arrived at his conclusion that drugs were
being kept at the premises for sale, nor did it say why the officer gave the
informer credence." Brief for Appellant at 7. This focus upon the role of the
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B. The Arnold Decision
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed Arnold's conviction.45
In doing so, the court emphasized that "[a]n informant selected by
the police, who makes a purchase of controlled substances under
the personal direction, supervision, and control of a police officer
... is presumptively reliable."4 6 The court observed that "[t]he
rule is well established that in evaluating the showing of probable
cause necessary to support a search warrant, only the probability,
and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity" need be estab-
lished.47 The court then articulated a two part state law test, not-
ing that "[w]here some of the underlying circumstances are
detailed," and "reason for crediting the source of the information is
given,"48 probable cause is established. Characterizing this pro-
cess as a "commonsense, realistic" examination of the warrant,
informant ignored much of the evidence presented in the request for the war-
rant, and in particular the fact that funds from the controlled purchase were
found in Arnold's purse. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
One indication of the extent to which criminal procedure practice in Ne-
braska has been dominated by federal rulings can be found in the posture
taken by appellant in her brief. Appellant expressly limited her appeal to the
question of whether the affidavit "satisfie [d] federal standards of reliability,"
Brief for Appellant at 6, and cited no Nebraska authorities in support of her
contention that probable cause standards had not been met.
45. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 336 N.W.2d 97 (1983). Judge McCown wrote for
the court and was joined by Chief Justice Krivosha and Judges Hastings,
Boslaugh, and Caporale. Judge White, joined by Judge Shanahan, wrote a
concurring opinion.
46. Id. at 773, 336 N.W.2d at 99-100 (citation omitted). This principle was estab-
lished in State v. Payne, 201 Neb. 665, 669, 271 N.W.2d 350, 352 (1978). See
supra note 31.
By emphasizing this aspect of the case, it appears that the court focused
its inquiry upon the narrow question of the reliability of the information se-
cured during the controlled purchases. This presented a different issue than
would been the case if the affidavit relied solely on the complaints from the
"concerned citizens" or the telephone tip.
This distinction is critical given the court's subsequent application of the
Gates analysis. In Gates, the informant was anonymous. See infra note 96
and accompanying text. Certain aspects of the information contained in the
letter regarding the Gates' activities proved to be incorrect, see infra note
101, and the activities that the Illinois police observed were at least colorably
"innocent." See infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text. In Arnold, how-
ever, the activities detailed in the affidavit involved clear criminal conduct,
and all relevant elements of the information secured from both the informant
and the citizens were fully corroborated by a thorough police investigation.
See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
47. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983).
48. Id. This standard was first adopted by the court in State v. LeDent, 185 Neb.
380, 384, 176 N.W.2d 21, 23-24 (1970), and is patterned after the test established
in Aguilar/Spinelli. See supra note 11.
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the court concluded that the it met applicable state law tests.49
The Nebraska court then referred to both Aguilar v. Texas5O
and Spinelli v. United States,5 1 primarily as vehicles for its accept-
ance of the revised standards articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.52 The court noted that Gates
recast the previous emphasis upon the need to establish an "in-
formant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge" 53 into "sim-
ply... closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
commonsense, practical question whether there is probable cause
to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular
place."A The court then set as its duty upon review a simple in-
quiry as to whether "the magistrate had a substantial basis for con-
cluding that probable cause existed."55
C. The Arnold Concurrence
In an eloquent concurring opinion, Judge White, joined by
Judge Shanahan, took issue with the court's willingness to
"blindly" adopt a search and seizure standard that, in his estima-
tion, "present[ed] the disturbing vision that the bedrock of our
federal constitutional rights may only be a mass of shifting
sand."5 6 In Judge White's estimation, the standard developed in
Aguilar and Spinelli, as affirmed by the Nebraska court in State v.
49. See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
50. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
51. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
52. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). The Arnold majority stated that "[t] he affidavit in the
present case was adequate to support the issuance of a search warrant under
the former standards of Aguilar v. Texas... and Spinelli v. United States.
... Its sufficiency is even more obvious under the totality of the circum-
stances test established by [Gates] .... ." State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774,
336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983).
53. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983).
54. Id. The exact standard adopted in Arnold provides that:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, com-
mensense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowl-
edge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.
Id. This test mirrors the language utilized by the Gates Court. See supra
note 9.
55. Id. The court has since cited the revised test with approval in State v.
Gilreath, 215 Neb. 466, 468-69, 339 N.W.2d 288,291 (1983), and State v. Williams,
214 Neb. 923, 928, 336 N.W.2d 605, 608 (1983). In Gilreath, the court described
GatesandArnold as having "relaxed somewhat" the warrant standards. This
characterization of the revised standard is, at best, suspect. See infra notes
173-80 and accompanying text.




LeDent,5 7 presented a sufficient basis for affirming Arnold's con-
viction.58 This rendered any discussion, much less acceptance, of
Gates unnecessary.
59
In addition, Judge White saw within the United States Supreme
Court's recent fourth amendment decisions a tendency to believe
that "the necessities of law enforcement require a more flexible
view of the fourth amendment."60 This, in his estimation,
57. 185 Neb. 380, 384, 176 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1970). See supra note 11 & infra notes 72-
75 and accompanying text.
58. Judge White stated: "I agree that the affidavit met the test of Aguilar. .. and
Spinelli . . . ." State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983)
(White, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 774-75, 336 N.W.2d at 100. In Gates, Justice White expressed a simlar
belief that the facts before the Court were sufficient to find probable cause for
issuance of a warrant under Aguilar and Spinelli. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317, 2347 (1983) (White, J., concurring). A number of state appellate courts
have refused to adopt Gates when the warrant met the requirements of Agui-
lar and Spinelli. See, e.g., State v. Summerlin, 675 P.2d 686, 691 n.1 (Ariz.
1983) (affidavit met Aguilar-Spinelli test; will not consider Gates); People v.
Wares, 129 Mich. App. 136, 140, 341 N.W.2d 256, 258 (1983) ("[WJe need not
decide whether the Aguilar-Spinelli view or the Gates view should be fol-
lowed as the law for the future [as] the affidavit here satisfies the more re-
strictive Aguilar-Spinelli test and thus would also satisfy Gates.") (footnote
omitted); State v. Randa, 342 N.W.2d 341, 342 n.2 (Minn. 1983) (affidavit meets
the Aguilar-Spinelli standard); State v. Myers, 35 Wash. App. 543, - n.6, 667
P.2d 1142, 1146 n.6 (1983) ("We need not consider the application of Gates in
this case, inasmuch as the supporting affidavit met the more rigorous stan-
dards of the Aguilar-Spinelli test."). The Arizona court has since adopted
Gates and found it to be retroactive, State v. Espinosa-Gamez, 678 P.2d 1379,
1384 (Ariz. 1984), and at least one lower appellate court in Minnesota has also
accepted Gates. Hanson v. State, 344 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Minn. App. 1984).
60. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983). The Court in
Gates made it clear that one of its primary motivations in promulgating a
"totality of circumstances" standard was to ease those "strictures that inevi-
tably accmpany the 'two-pronged test' [which] cannot avoid seriously imped-
ing the task of law enforcement ... " Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331
(1983) (citations omitted).
This concern for accommodating the police has surfaced with increasing
frequency in the Court's recent search and seizure rulings. See, e.g., United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982) (arguing that "practical consequences
... would be largely nullified if the permissible scope of a warrantless search
of an automobile did not include containers and packages found inside the
vehicle"). Professor Gardner has noted that "the impact of Ross may ulti-
mately extend beyond the automobile into the fourth amendment world in
general." Gardner, Searches and Seizures Of Automobiles And Their Con-
tents: Fourth Amendment Considerations In A Post-Ross World, 62 NEB. L.
REV. 1, 34 (1983). The Court's subsequent rulings in Gates and Villamonte-
Marquez, see supra note 12, provide evidence that this fear is not misplaced.
Perhaps even more alarming are the dangers posed when state courts mis-
apply these Burger Court rulings. For example, in State v. Smith, 344 N.W.2d
505 (S.D. 1984), the court utilized Ross as the basis for sustaining a warrant to
search both apartments in a two-family dwelling when tracks in the snow
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presented the spectre of "a more orderly society" that would, inevi-
tably, "be a less free society."6 1 Given his belief that the court's
decision left the people of this state with "one less tree to shield us
from the devil,"62 Judge White declared that "[iln my view, it is
now past time to consider search and seizure cases in light of Neb.
Const. art. I, § 7,"63 with the court "adopt [ing] a standard based on
the Nebraska Constitution and offer[ing] such protection as we
may in the courts of Nebraska."64
I. ANALYSIS
A careful comparison of Arnold and Gates provides an opportu-
nity to both examine an important area of criminal procedure, and
to explore the reasoning that the United States Supreme Court has
employed in its recent efforts to reshape search and seizure law.
In Arnold, the Nebraska Court elected to adopt the Gates stan-
dard in a case where the affidavit met the test set forth in Aguilar
from a robbery scene led to the common entrance. Id. at 508. As one judge
noted in dissent
The majority's reliance on United States v. Ross . . . is misplaced.
Ross . .. dealt with the search of an automobile trunk. This case
deals with the search of an apartment house. The law applicable to
constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
which extends to searches of automobiles, cannot carte blanche, be
engrafted upon the home of a citizen.
Id. at 510 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring).
62. Id. at 769, 336 N.W.2d at 100-101. The allusion is to a statement attributed to
Sir Thomas More in A Man For All Seasons.
63. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983) (White, J., concur-
ring). See supra note 22 for the text of Art. I, § 7.
64. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775-76, 336 N.W.2d 97, 101 (1983) (White, J., con-
curring).
Judge White has consistently argued that the courts must resist any and
all pressures to condone police misconduct, even in the face of strong evi-
dence that the suspect was guilty:
The evidence is probably conclusive that the defendant was a
large dealer in dangerous drugs and that suppression of the evidence
would result in his freedom. As it was put by Mr. Justice (then
judge) Cardozo: "the criminal is to go free because the constable has
blundered."... I am as reluctant as the majority to bring about this
result, but as Mr. Justice Clark responded in Mapp v. Ohio.......
'there is another consideration-the imperative of judicial integrity.'
... The criminal goes free... but it is the law that sets him free.
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence."




and Spinelli.65 This was, of course, the court's prerogative. 66 Nev-
ertheless, a careful examination of the Gates decision 67 leads to
the conclusion that the United States Supreme Court engaged in a
legal tour deforce that ignored the facts of the case, misread previ-
ous case law, and arguably promulgated a probable cause standard
that lends itself to confusion and abuse.68 Viewed in this light, the
precipitous acceptance of Gates by the Arnold majority was un-
wise, as is the continuing advisability of following the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in search and seizure cases in Ne-
braska. Accordingly, the desirability of promulgating a Nebraska
standard keyed to the guarantees of Article I, section 7, of the Ne-
braska Constitution becomes both evident and compelling.
65. As indicated, while the Gates ruling was available to the court, neither party
in Arnold indicated in any way that the previous tests were inappropriate.
See supra note 18.
66. The court's willingness to do so is, however, at odds with its settled rule that
"the court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it, and will not formulate a rule of constitutional law
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 92, 277 N.W. 762, 767 (1938); accord, State
v. Austin, 209 Neb. 174, 306 N.W.2d 861 (1981); State ex rel. Casselman v.
Macken, 194 Neb. 806, 235 N.W.2d 867 (1975).
In a slightly different context, Chief Justice Krivosha has pointed out the
problems inherent within a precipitous application of United States Supreme
Court rulings to search and seizure issues in Nebraska: "[tihe recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions of Rawlings v. Kentucky. . . and United States v.
Salvucci... at least raise some serious question about when a person has a
legitimate expectation of privacy so that a claim based upon a fourth amend-
ment violation can be raised or entertained." State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325,
336, 299 N.W.2d 421, 428 (1980) (Krivosha, C.J., concurring) (citations omit-
ted). That being the case, he would have "awaited answering the question
... [until] a case which requires us to answer that question after the parties
have fully and adequately briefed and argued the question to us. The answer
to that question may not be quite as clear as we have indicated in our major-
ity opinion today." Id. at 336-37, 299 N.W.2d at 428.
In People v. McFall, 672 P.2d 534 (Colo. 1983), the court adopted an ap-
proach in a post-Gates case that tracked closely the one suggested by Chief
Justice Krivosha in Vicars: 'The defendant did not have an opportunity to
argue the Gates totality of the circumstances standard on appeal. Therefore,
we rely solely upon the more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test for our decision."
Id. at 538 n.5.
67. It should, however, be emphasized that the court did not have the luxury of a
protracted period within which to examine Gates. As indicated, any applica-
tion of Gates in Arnold was necessarily limited by the short time between the
dates upon which the respective decisions were announced. See supra note
18.
68. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
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A. The Arnold Court's Treatment of Existing Case Law
In Arnold the court provided a concise summary of the legal
principles that govern probable cause determinations in Nebraska:
The rule is well established that in evaluating the showing of probable
cause necessary to support a search warrant, only the probability, and not
a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard for determining
probable cause ....
Affidavits for search warrants must be tested in a commonsense, realis-
tic fashion. Where some of the underlying circumstances are detailed in
the affidavit, where reason is given for crediting the source of the informa-
tion is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the court
should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a
hypertechnical rather than a commonsense manner.
69
Under this standard, a magistrate must be given sufficient informa-
tion to determine that there is a "probability" of criminal activity.
In assessing that information, it is incumbent upon the magistrate
to exercise independent judgment, and not to rely upon conclu-
sions reached by police officers "engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."70 This is particularly important
in those instances where the probable cause determination must,
to any significant degree, rest upon information secured from
informants.7
1
Prior to Arnold, the Nebraska court had declared that questions
regarding "underlying circumstances" and "reason[s] ... for
crediting the source of the information"72 provided by informants
would be assessed within the contexts provided by the United
States Supreme Court's holdings in Aguilar and Spinelli. The
evolution of the Nebraska test was gradual. The court's initial ref-
erences to both Aguilar and Spinelli were in cases that did not
expressly adopt their holdings,73 and it was not until LeDent that
69. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983). As is the case with
most criminal procedure standards in Nebraska, this standard is derived in
large part from Supreme Court interpretations of fourth amendment guaran-
tees. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (probable
cause as "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act"). The origins and devel-
opment of modern search and seizure standards in Nebraska are traced in
some detail in Comment, Nebraska Standards on Search and Seizure, 56 NEB.
L. REv. 599 (1977).
70. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
71. See supra note 23 & infra note 220 and accompanying text.
72. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983).
73. The court noted in State v. McCreary, 179 Neb. 589, 139 N.W.2d 362 (1966), that
"[t]he defendant relies on Aguilar v. Texas... [but] [t]he case is controlled
by United States v. Ventresca ... ." Id. at 593, 139 N.W.2d at 365 (citations
omitted). In much the same vein, the court in State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274,
283-85, 167 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1969), referred to Spinelli, but did not articulate a
specific standard that matched the "two-pronged" Aguilar/Spinelli test.
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the court articulated a specific, albeit derivative, Nebraska test that
appeared to encompass both the Aguilar and Spinelli holdings.
7 4
Some of the Nebraska cases dealing with these issues made pass-
ing reference to Article I, section 7, of the Nebraska Constitution.75
Nevertheless, the clear trend on the part of the Nebraska court in
cases dealing with informant's tips had been to adhere to the
framework initiated in Aguilar and refined in Spinelli.
When examined within the framework provided by Aguilar,
Spinelli, and LeDent, it becomes apparent that both the majority
and Judge White were correct in their assessment that the warrant
was sufficient under applicable Nebraska standards. The investi-
gation in Arnold was initiated as a direct result of tips from "con-
cerned citizens" 76 and strengthened after the receipt of
information from the unidentified informant.7 7 This information,
however, constituted only a small portion of the facts presented to
the Municipal Court in the affidavit; the tips themselves would not
have led the police to Arnold, except through the most fortuitous
of circumstances. 78 Rather, it was Arnold's apparent participation
74. The rule that emerged provided:
For the affidavit of a tip from an informant to be sufficient the magis-
trate must be informed of (1) some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were located
where he claimed they were, and (2) some of the underlying circum-
stances from which the officer concluded that the informant was
credible.
State v. LeDent, 185 Neb. 380, 384, 176 N.W.2d 21, 23 (1970).
75. See, e.g., State v. Howard, 184 Neb. 274, 167 N.W.2d 80 (1969):
We will consider [the defendant's] argument... being mindful that
both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, section 7, of the Nebraska Constitution, relate to the right of
the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures,
and that search warrants shall issue only upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation.
Id. at 278, 167 N.W.2d at 84 (emphasis in original).
76. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 770, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983). As indicated, in
Nebraska, citizen informants are presumptively reliable. See supra note 23.
77. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 770-71, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983). There is nothing
in the decision to indicate what weight the court attached to the information
secured from the unidentified informant and the concerned citizens. How-
ever, by stressing the reliability of information received during a "controlled
purchase" of drugs, the court appears to have determined that the magistrate
relied in large part on the information obtained through the independent po-
lice investigations. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
78. The concerned citizens gave the police two addresses, 3416 Parker St. and
1714 N. 34th St., and a license plate number. Officer Nepodal's investigation
revealed that the original N. 34th St. address was incorrect but that the Ross
residence at 1722 N. 34th St. fit the description given in the anonymous tele-
phone call received by Sergeant Sieh of the Vice/Narcotics Unit in January,
1982. Brief for Appellee at 5-6. Neither of the addresses was Ms. Arnold's,
and the license plate number would not have linked Arnold to Ross absent
her involvement in the sale of the marijuana. In fact, the offense for which
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in the sale of the marijuana to the controlled informant that impli-
cated her.7 9 Viewed objectively, the information that led the police
to Arnold was secured through a carefully controlled investigation
that met applicable legal tests.80
As a result, police conduct in Arnold avoided, in large part,
those "Pitfalls" that many courts and commentators have detected
in the development and application of the rules that have evolved
from the core holdings of Aguilar and Spinelli.81 The affidavit set
Ms. Arnold was ultimately convicted had nothing to do with the marijuana
purchases.
79. The affidavit and warrant were directed toward a suspicion of criminal activi-
ties engendered when Ross led the police to the Arnold residence. Probable
cause for the search of the Arnold residence was present, and the LSD was
properly seized during the execution of a valid warrant. See supra note 40.
80. The situation in Arnold thus stands in sharp contrast to that present in Agui-
lar. In Aguilar, the police in their affidavit averred that they had received
"reliable information from a credible person and [did] believe," that narcot-
ics were being kept at the defendant's residence. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 109 (1964). A warrant was issued based solely upon this information. No
mention was made in the affidavit of any corroborating investigation, al-
though the police had apparently kept the house under surveillance for a pe-
riod of time prior to their request for a warrant. Noting that this information
had not been presented to the magistrate, the Court emphasized that: "If the
fact and results of such surveillance had been appropriately presented to the
magistrate, this would, of course, present an entirely different case." Id. at
108 n.1.
Justice Clark dissented in Aguilar, arguing that the majority had "substi-
tuted a rigid, academic formula for the unrigid standards of reasonableness
and 'probable cause'. . . a substitution of technicality for practicality," id. at
122 (Clark, J. dissenting), and that "[t]he totality of the circumstances upon
which the officer relied is certainly pertinent to the validity of the warrant."
Id. at 120. This analysis foreshadowed much of the reasoning employed by
the Court when it abandoned Aguilar and Spinelli in Gates.
By way of contrast, the majority in Spinelli stated that "[w] e believe, how-
ever, that the 'totality of circumstances' approach taken by the Court of Ap-
peals paints with too broad a brush. Where, as here, the informer's tip is a
necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be
determined by a more precise analysis." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 415 (1969). Justice Blackmun was a member of the 8th Circuit majority
whose decision was overruled in Spinelli.
One commentator provided an interesting side-note to Spinelli when he
observed that "[t]here is a heavy hint in the concurring opinion by Justice
Byron R. White that the Court believed that the F.B.L's 'confidential reliable
informant' might well have been a tap on those two suspicious telephone
lines (a belief that was widely shared by officials within the Justice Depart-
ment itself)." F. GRAHAm, THE SELF-INIUCTED WouND 210 (1970).
81. Both Aguilar and Spinelli were adopted in the face of sharply worded dis-
sents, and various members of the Court have criticized the "two-pronged"
test, and in particular the standard set forth in Spinelli. For example, in
United State v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971), a badly splintered Court was un-
able to generate an opinion that would command the support of a majority of
the Justices, apparently because of the hostility of some Justices to the Agui-
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forth in considerable detail the "underlying circumstances" from
which both the controlled informant and the police concluded that
narcotics were probably located at both the Ross and the Arnold
residences.82 Standing alone, neither the information from "con-
cerned citizens" nor that secured from the telephone call to the
narcotics unit would have been sufficient. When coupled with the
police's extensive investigative activities, however, any difficulties
that might have arisen as a result of the use of informant informa-
tion were overcome.
B. The Arnold Court's Adoption of Gates
The true significance of the Arnold decision lies in its unques-
tioning adoption of the standard promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.83 In Gates, the Court ad-
dressed for the first time the "application of the Fourth Amend-
ment to a magistrate's issuance of a search warrant on the basis of
a partially corroborated anonymous informant's tip."84 This focus
upon the relative weight of information secured from an anony-
mous informant is important,85 and stands in sharp contrast to the
lar/Spinelli test: "I would go further and overrule [Aguilar and Spinelli]
and wipe their holdings from the books ... ." United States v. Harris, 403
U.S. 573, 585 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); "I continue to feel today that
Spinelli at this level was wrongly decided and, like Mr. Justice Black, I would
overrule it." Id. at 586 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Numerous commentators have also criticized the Aguilar/Spinelli test on
a variety of grounds. See, e.g., LaFave, Probable Cause from Informants: The
Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 1; Livermore, The Draper-Spinelli Problem, 21 ARIz. L, REV. 945 (1979);
Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25
MERCER L. REV. 741 (1974); Rebell, The Undisclosed Informant and the Fourth
Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE.J. 703 (1972);
Comment, Anonymous Tips, supra note 23; Note, Probable Cause and the
First-Time Informer, 43 CoLO. L. Rv. 357 (1972); Note, The Informer's Tip as
Probable Cause for Search and Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 958 (1969).
82. The transactions occurred at the Ross residence, and Ross had apparently
secured the marijuana involved in the second controlled purchase from the
Arnold residence, all under the surveillance of the police.
83. 103 S. Ct. 2317, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 33 (1983).
84. Id. at 2321 (emphasis added). The Court had previously denied certiorari in
at least two cases that presented similar questions. See Anderson v. United
States, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.) and White v. United States, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 924 (1981); Jernigan v. Louisiana, 377 So. 2d 1222
(La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 958 (1980). In each case, Justice White, joined
by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented from the denial of the writ, ar-
guing, for example, that it "left the state and lower federal courts in conflict
and confusion over whether an anonymous tip may furnish reasonable suspi-
cion for an investigatory detention." White v. United States, 454 U.S. 924, 924
(1981) (White, J., dissenting).
85. Neither Aguilar nor Spinelli involved information from an anonymous
source. InAguilar, "[a]ffiants... received reliable information from a credi-
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situation in Arnold, where the initial tip was provided by presump-
tively reliable "concerned citizens," and the information secured
during the telephone call from the "unidentified informant" was
subsequently corroborated in full.86
Unfortunately, the Gates Court did not confine its holding to
the narrow issue that it framed in the first part of its decision.
8 7
Rather, it used Gates as a vehicle for the formulation of a new
standard for the evaluation of affidavits, not simply in situations
presenting the particular problems posed by anonymous tips,88 but
for all warrant applications.89
The revised standard represented a significant departure from
previous tests, and careful consideration of its implications would
have been warranted prior to its adoption by a state court.9 0 This
does not, however, appear to have been the case in Arnold. Cer-
tain factual elements were common to the two cases.9 1 Neverthe-
less, a careful comparison of them reveals that the resemblances
ble person . . ." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 (1964). In Spinelli, the
magistrate was told that "the FBI has been informed by a confidential relia-
ble informant. . . ." Spinelli v. United states, 393 U.S. 410, 414 (1968). The
informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), the case whose fact
pattern was utilized by the Spinelli Court as a "suitable benchmark," Spinelli
v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1968), was "a 'special employee' of the Bu-
reau of Narcotics ... [whose information] had always [been] found ... to
be accurate and reliable." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 309 (1959).
The importance of this fact in Draper has generally been overlooked, and the
Court's subsequent treatment of Draper has been a source of confusion. See
infra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
86. The telephone informant indicated only that "a person named Ross was sell-
ing marijuana in the 34th and Decatur Streets area." State v. Arnold, 214 Neb.
769, 771, 336 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1983). The subsequent controlled purchases were
made from Robert Ross.
87. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
88. See infra note 220 and accompanying text.
89. While the majority initiated its discussion with a statement that the issue
presented involved questions arising from an anonymous tip, see supra note
84 and accompanying text, the rule that it formulated its not expressly lim-
ited to probable cause inquiries involving informants. See supra note 11.
Rather, the Court fashioned a broad rule that will, presumably, be applied to
all warrant determinations. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did pre-
cisely this in Bellah v. State, 653 S.W.2d 795, 796 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)
("Gates involved a search warrant, but the rationale is equally applicable to
the arrest warrant in this case. .. ") (citation omitted). See also Common-
wealth v. Moore, - Pa. Super. _ - n.3, 467 A.2d 862, 865 n.3 (1983) (Gates
standard applies to arrest warrants).
90. This would be particularly true when that court has consistently held that
constitutional rulings should be narrowly tailored to fit the specific facts
before the court. See supra note 66.
91. Each investigation was initiated after the police had received a tip, and in
each the police supplemented the informant's information through an inves-




between the cases are, at best, superficial, 92 making the wisdom of
the Nebraska court's precipitous adoption of the Gates standard
questionable.
1. Arnold and Gates: The Respective Courts' Treatment of
the Facts
In Arnold the police investigation centered upon a carefully
orchestrated sequence of events that documented explicit criminal
activities.9 3 No innocent gloss could be placed upon Ms. Arnold's
conduct. Leaving aside her subsequent admissions, 94 the web of
facts detailed in the police affidavit more than met the probable
cause requirements envisioned under even the strictest interpreta-
tion of the applicable tests.95
The situation in Gates was categorically different. The investi-
gation that led to the conviction of Lance and Susan Gates began
when the Bloomingdale, Illinois police received an anonymous let-
ter that claimed that the Gates were selling drugs and predicted a
specific pattern of future criminal conduct.96 Certain aspects of
the anonymous letter and its predictions about future actions by
92. Factual parallels are neither necessary nor likely, and the sole concern of the
court should be the careful application of the proper legal standard. Never-
theless, a careful examination of the two cases reveals substantial discrepan-
cies that become all the more noteworthy given the Nebraska court's explicit
statement that prior tests were met. See supra notes 52 & 58-59 and accompa-
nying text.
93. This is not to imply that the police in Gates did not engage in a structured
investigation. Rather, the focus here is upon the nature of the activities that
the police observed and reported in their affidavit.
94. It does not appear that the court placed any great weight upon Arnold's ad-
mission that she had received funds from Ross to purchase the marijuana.
State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773, 336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983). The court's deci-
sion may, then, be read fairly as relying solely upon its assessment of the
contents of the affidavit. This does not appear to have been the case in Gates.
See infra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
95. For example, none of the reasons traditionally given for discrediting inform-
ant information would apply in Arnold. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 23, at
§ 3.3. See also infra note 220 and accompanying text. In addition, the affidavit
would have been sustained under the applicable alternate formulations for
probable cause determinations outlined in Comment, supra note 23, at 124
n.233.
96. The entire letter read:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town
who strictly make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and
Lance Gates, they live on Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the con-
dominiums. Most of their buys are done in Florida. Sue his wife
drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be loaded up with
drugs, when Lance flys down and drives it back. Sue flys back after
she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there
again and Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At
the time Lance drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over
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the Gates were borne out: Lance Gates did fly to Florida,9 7 did
meet his wife at a motel,98 and did return to Bloomingdale 99 in a
$100,000.00 in drugs. Presently they have over $100,000.00 worth of
drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their
entire living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch.
They are friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house
often.
Lance & Susan Gates
Greenway
in Condominiums.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).
One aspect of the anonymous letter, its reference to the frequent visits of
"some big drug dealers," appears to have been lost on the Bloomingdale po-
lice. Rather than placing the Gates residence under surveillance, and possi-
bly identifying and arresting numerous pushers, the police elected to serve
the warrant immediately. This lack of professionalism stands in sharp con-
trast to the conduct of the Omaha police in Arnold, who engaged in an exten-
sive investigation that drew within its web parties, and in particular Ms.
Arnold, who were not mentioned in the initial tips. More importantly, by
sanctioning this conduct, the Gates majority does implicit violence to the
need to detect "sophisticated criminal syndicates" that certain of its mem-
bers have stressed when arguing for a different standard of review in drug
cases. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1332 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (police conduct in airport drug profile detention "should not be
subjected to a requirement of probable cause"); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (obstacles to detection of
drug traffic are immense and should be accounted for). See also infra notes
185 & 250 and accompanying text.
97. However, unlike suspects in other drug cases that have come before the
Court, see, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983), Lance Gates's conduct
did not fit any of the patterns of behavior outlined in drug courier profiles:
Lance does not appear to have behaved suspiciously in flying
down to Florida. He made a reservation in his own name and gave an
accurate home phone number to the airlines .... [The] affidavit
does not report that he did any of the other things drug couriers are
notorious for doing, such as paying for the ticket in cash,. . . dress-
ing casually,. . . looking pale and nervous,. . . improperly filling out
baggage tags,. . . carrying American Tourister luggage, .. not car-
rying any luggage.., or changing airline en route ....
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2360 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
Nor, as the Court has found, would a simple match to such a profile neces-
sarily justify the conclusion that criminal activity was afoot: "We cannot
agree with the State, if this is its position, that every nervous young man pay-
ing cash for a ticket to New York City under an assumed name and carrying
two heavy American Tourister bags may be arrested and held to answer for a
serious felony charge." Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1329 (1983) (plurality
opinion).
98. The affidavit stated, however, only that "a female" had left West Palm Beach
with Lance. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 757, 403 N.E.2d 77, 82 (1980).




vehicle that subsequently was found to contain marijuana. 0 0
Other statements in the letter, however, proved to be inaccurate.l0 l
As Justice Stevens observed in his dissenting opinion,102 the
critical link in forging the probable cause chain was that the Gates
returned immediately to Bloomingdale. 03 The Illinois magistrate
did not, however, know this at the time that the request for the
warrant was made.104 All that he knew was that Lance Gates had
met a woman in Florida and had left West Palm Beach on an inter-
state highway that, in the words of both the majority and Justice
99. At the time that the warrant was issued the magistrate knew only that the
Gates had left West Palm Beach; he did not know their destination.
100. Illinois v. Gates, 103 U.S. 2317, 2325-26 (1983). It should be noted that in his
dissenting opinion Justice Stevens argued that the searches of the house and
car might arguably be treated differently in light of the Court's decision in
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2361-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Stevens would have
found that the search of the house was not valid, id. at 2361, and that the
search of the car should be reexamined by the Illinois court in light of Ross.
Id. at 2362.
101. Susan Gates had remained in Florida to meet Lance, while the anonymous
letter had predicted that she would fly back. Justice Stevens found this sig-
nificant: "The informant had predicted an itinerary that always kept one
spouse in Bloomingdale, suggesting that the Gates did not want to leave their
home unguarded because something valuable was hidden within. That infer-
ence obviously could not be drawn when it was known that the pair was actu-
ally together over a thousand miles from home." Id. at 2360 (1983) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). The majority, in turn, argued that this discrepancy should be
discounted because "[w] e have never required that informants used by the
police be infallible, and can see no reason to impose such a requirement in
this case." Id. at 2335, n.14. This debate is largely irrelevant. It seems to as-
sume that criminals have both the insight and capacity to always act in their
own best interest. Even if such a belief were warranted, however, it does not
account for the fact that those activities known at the time that the warrant
was found were innocent on their face.
102. As indicated, Justice Stevens in dissent argued that the warrant should be
treated differently as to the house and the car. See supra note 100.
103. The majority stressed that "only 36 hours after [Lance] had flown out of Chi-
cago [the Gates] returned to their home in Bloomingdale, driving the car in
which they had left West Palm Beach some 22 hours earlier." Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2326 (1983). As Justice Stevens pointed out, however
The fact that Lance and Sue Gates made a 22-hour nonstop drive
from West Palm Beach, Florida, to Bloomingdale, Illinois, only a few
hours after Lance had flown to Florida provided persuasive evidence
that they were engaged in illict activity. That fact, however, was not
known to the magistrate when he issued the warrant to search their
home.
Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. It has long been settled that magistrates may consider only that information




White, indicated only an "apparent immediate return North."105
But, as Justice Stevens observed, it is far from obvious that travel-
ers on that highway are in fact destined for the Chicago area.1
06
Indeed, it was likely "that each year dozens of perfectly innocent
people fly to Florida, meet a waiting spouse, and drive off together
in the family car."' 0 7
105. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983); id. at 2348 (White, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
106. In fact, "the same highway is also commonly used by travelers to Disney
World, Sea World, and Ringling Brothers and Barnum and Bailey Circus
World. It is also the road to Cocoa Beach, Cape Canaveral, and Washington,
D.C." Id. at 2360 n.3 (Stevens, J dissenting).
107. Id. Justice White conceded this point, id. at 2349 n.24 (White, J., concurring),
but preferred to "agree with the Court ... that Lance Gates' flight to Palm
Beach, an area known to be a source of narcotics, the brief overnight stay in a
motel, and apparent immediate return North, suggest a pattern that trained
law enforcement officers have recognized as indicative of illicit drug-dealing
activity." Id. at 2348 (footnote omitted). Both Justice White and the majority
appear to have attached considerable weight to the area's reputation: "fi] n
addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is well-known as a source of
narcotics and other illegal drugs." Id. at 2334.
It appears that a majority of the Court in Gates argued that a magistrate
may determine that probable cause exists through "guilt by association."
Probable cause determinations are subject to a somewhat lower evidentiary
threshold than proof of criminal guilt. See supra note 69 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, the potential for abuse within such a standard is im-
mense. Moreover, a careful examination of other recent decisions of the
Court indicates that certain justices are, at best, inconsistent in their applica-
tion of this principle. In Royer, for example, Justice Blackmun in dissent ar-
gued that "[t]he character of the police room did not transform the encounter
into the functional equivalent of an arrest." Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319,
1334 n.2 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In a similar vein, Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice O'Connor, took exception with
the plurality opinion's characterization of the room where Royer was de-
tained. Id. at 1342 n.10 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). In Royer, then, the nature
of a given place was unimportant if it served to free the defendant; in Gates,
where it would allow conviction, this same characteristic suddenly became
significant.
State courts have begun to rely upon the Gates characterization of Florida
in their probable cause determinations. For example, in State v. Lang, 105
Idaho 683, 672 P.2d 561 (1983), the court cited Gates as authority for the propo-
sition that "[t] he destination of the suspect further bolstered the finding of
probable cause. In addition to being a popular vacation site, Florida is well
known as a source of narcotics and other drugs .... ." Id. at 685, 672 P.2d at
563 (citations omitted). Lang produced a sharply worded dissent, within
which the dissenting judge took issue with the Idaho court's willingness to
follow Gates and "stigmatize ... the whole state of Florida. . . heaping care-
lessness upon carelessness." Id. at 691, 672 P.2d at 569 (Bistline, J., dissent-
ing).
The Nebraska court has, however, on at least one occasion soundly re-
jected similar assertions:
Next is the claim of the officer that vans and campers are used
more than other vehicles for transportation of controlled substances.
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The majority in Gates refused to accept this possible explana-
tion of the Gates conduct, preferring instead to focus upon what it
characterized as the "suspicious" nature of their activities. 0 8
Viewed dispassionately, however, the conduct of both Lance and
Susan Gates was at least arguably innocent, and it was upon this
reading of the facts that the Illinois courts focused in reaching
their determinations that the requirements of Aguilar and Spinelli
had not been met.
Both Illinois courts found that the "corroborated" activities of
the Gates were innocent on their face.10 9 The majority in Gates
acknowledged the Illinois Supreme Court's characterization of the
activities detailed in the warrant as innocent. Nevertheless, it
stated that "[w] e are inclined to agree, however, with the observa-
tion of [Illinois] Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion that '[i]n
this case, just as in Draper, seemingly innocent activity became
suspicious in light of the initial tip.' "110
Unfortunately, this characterization misreads the result in
Draper v. United States,"' and perpetuates the confusion gener-
ated when the Spinelli Court referred to the fact pattern in Draper
as "detail ... [that] provides a suitable benchmark" for an ade-
quate informant tip.1i2 In Draper an identified informant1 3 pre-
This may be true, but it is also true that there are tens of thousands
of such vehicles that are not used for such purposes. We can hardly
say that each and every camper van may be searched. There is no
way we can remove the owners and operators of all such vehicles
from the protection of the Fourth Amendment. The nature of the ve-
hicle alone surely is not enough, if, in fact, it is at all significant.
State v. Aden, 196 Neb. 149, 158, 241 N.W.2d 669, 673 (1976).
108. The travel pattern was "as suggestive of a pre-arranged drug run, as it [was]
of an ordinary vacation trip." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S Ct. 2317, 2334 (1983).
109. The Illinois Supreme Coiut concluded that "It]he corroboration of innocent
activity is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause." People v.
Gates, 85 IM. 2d 376, 390, 423 N.E.2d 887, 893 (1981). The initial appellate court
noted: "Were we to accept the State's argument, we would permit govern-
ment invasion of the privacy of persons solely on the basis of anonymous
tips, made perhaps out of spite or based upon unsubstantiated rumor, merely
because innocent details have been verified by the observations of a police
officer." People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755, 403 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1980).
110. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n.13 (1983). In his dissent, Judge Moran
declared: "In this case, as in Draper, every detail of the informant's informa-
tion was corroborated by the police investigation." People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d
376, 394, 423 N.E.2d 887, 895 (1981) (Moran, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
This was simply not true. See supra note 101.
111. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
112. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969). This use of Draper by the
Court in Spinelli has, quite properly, been cited as a source of great confusion
for the courts in their attempts to apply the Aguilar and Spinelli holdings.
See generally supra note 81 and authorities cited therein. In New York, the
Court of Appeals cited this confusion as one of the major factors in its deci-
sion to reject the Aguilar-Spinelli-Draper morass and fashion its own stan-
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dicted that Draper would return to Denver from Chicago with
heroin in his possession," 4 and described in detail Draper's physi-
cal attributes, attire, and demeanor." 5 The predictions proved
accurate.
As the majority in Gates correctly noted, "all of the corroborat-
ing detail established in Draper... was of entirely innocent activ-
ity.""n 6 The Court's attempt to square the facts in Draper with
those in Gates is, however, unconvincing. The informant in
Draper was known and his reliability previously established.11
7
The Gates majority argued that, in Draper, independent police in-
vestigation had corroborated the informant information." 8 How-
dard based upon the New York Constitution. See People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d
231, 241-42, 406 N.E.2d 471, 477-78, 428 N.Y.S.2d 655, 662 (1980) (state constitu-
tion requires that magistrate be provided "noncriminal detail received from
the informant ... so explicit and extensive and so well confirmed by police
observation as to warrant the inference that the informant or his source was
speaking from personal observation"). In People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 452
N.E.2d 1185, 465 N.Y.S.2d 857 (1983), the court refused to consider the Gates
standard, arguing that Elwell provided the applicable test. Id. at 375 n.*, 452
N.E.2d at 1188 n.*, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 860 n.*.
113. The informant's name was Hereford. The Court noted that he "had been en-
gaged as a 'special employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for about
six months, and from time to time gave information... regarding violations
of the narcotics laws, for which [he] was paid small sums of money, and...
the information [had always been] accurate and reliable." Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 309 (1959). Unfortunately, "Hereford died four days after
the arrest and therefore did not testify at the hearing on the motion [to sup-
press]." Id. at 310.
114. Specifically, Hereford alleged that Draper was "'peddling narcotics to several
addicts' in [Denver]." Id. at 309.
115. Hereford provided specific details as to the date, time, and mode of transpor-
tation that Draper would employ, his clothing, a bag he would be carrying,
and his habits. Id. The only detail left to verify was that Draper did in fact
have the heroin in his possession.
116. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 n.13 (1983).
117. See supra note 113. This situation was not present in either Aguilar or
Spinelli, and was by definition impossible given the anonymous informant in
Gates. See supra note 85.
118. The majority in Gates asserted that:
The Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that Draper involved an in-
formant who had given reliable information on previous occasions,
while the honesty and reliability of the anonymous informant in this
case were unknown to the Bloomingdale police. While this distinc-
tion might be an apt one at the time the police department received
the anonymous letter, it became far less significant after ... in-
dependent investigative work occurred.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2335 (1983). The difficulty with this conten-
tion lies in the extent to which one needs to color the activities documented
by the independent investigation with the assertions of criminality secured
from a totally anonymous source. In this regard it is interesting to note that
the State of Illinois made the following assertion in its appeal of Gates:
The informer in this case was a citizen informer rather than a paid
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ever, this rather cursory treatment seriously misrepresents the
process by which the Draper Court arrived at its determination
that the tip should be credited. In Draper, the majority employed
an analytic sequence within which it expressly stated:
[tjhe information given to narcotic agent Marsh by 'special employee'
Hereford may have been hearsay to Marsh, but coming from one employed
for that purpose and whose information had always been found accurate
and reliable, it is clear that Marsh would have been derelict in his duties
had he not pursued it. 1 1 9
The informant in Gates was, however, anonymous. As the
Court conceded:
We are inclined to agree-that, standing alone, the anonymous letter sent
to the Bloomingdale Police Department would not provide the basis for a
magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe that
contraband would be found in the Gates' car and home. The letter pro-
vides virtually nothing from which one might conclude that its author is
either honest or his information reliable; likewise, the letter gives abso-
lutely no indication of the basis for the writer's predictions regarding the
Gates' criminal activities. Something more was required, then, before a
magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that
contraband would be found .... 
12 0
police informant. The informer volunteered his information. He re-
ceived no reward. He had no apparent financial reason to lie. In this
respect, the informer in this case resesmbles the unnamed "third
persons having knowledge of the said taxpayer's financial condition"
whose information was credited in Jaben v. United States ... or the
eyewitnesses whose information was credited in Chambers v. Ma-
roney ....
Brief for Petitioner at 19-20 (citations omitted). It is difficult to see how this
statement could have been made with a straight face, absent the subsequent
documentation of criminal activities after the warrant had actually been
served. Even then, the verification of the details established only that the
informant's information was generally correct; it tells one nothing of his
character.
119. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1959) (emphasis added). In his
concurring opinion in Spinelli, Justice White noted that-
The thrust of Draper is not that the [nine] verified facts have in-
dependent significance with respect to proof of the tenth [fact]. The
argument instead relates to the reliability of the source: because an
informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about
other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
Justices White and Brennan debated the meaning of this statement in
their respective opinions in Gates. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2348-49
(1983) (White, J., concurring); id. at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (em-
phasizing technical consideration of the "veracity" and "reliability" prongs of
Aguilar/Spinelli). Such inquiries may or may not be illuminating. The cen-
tral, and essentially ignored, point in Draper was that the informant was
known and had been previously shown to be reliable. It was on this basis
that the Draper Court determined that Hereford had provided "inside infor-
mation" which, while innocent on its face, could be safely connected with
criminal activities.
120. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2326 (1983). It does appear that the Court did
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Prior to the point at which the warrant was served, nothing that
the Gates did presented evidence of overt criminal activities.12 1 As
Justice Stevens noted, "[giiven that the note's predictions were
faulty in one significant respect, and were corroborated by nothing
except ordinary innocent activity, I must surmise that the Court's
evaluation of the warrant's validity has been colored by subse-
quent events."'122 Viewed in this context, the Court's holding falls
squarely within the now apparently discredited warning in
Spinelli that courts must avoid affirming warrants based upon "al-
legations [that] contain no suggestion of criminal conduct when
taken by themselves ... and ... are ... endowed with an aura of
suspicion [solely] by virtue of the informer's tip."12 3
Regardless of whether the Court's holding in Gates was "cor-
rect," a strong case can be made for distinguishing the fact pat-
terns in Gates and Arnold. As the Gates Court readily admitted,
the affidavit in that case failed to meet the requirements of Aguilar
and Spinelli.124 Accordingly, the Court needed to reach out and
embrace a new, less stringent standard in order to sustain the
search and seizure. In Arnold, however, there was no need to fash-
ion a new doctrine. The affidavit met applicable tests, and police
conduct was meticulous and correct.125 Given the significant im-
pact that the adoption of the Gates standard will have upon search
reject the State of Illinois' attempt to characterize the informant as an "pure"
citizen informant. See supra note 118. In his dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in Jernigan v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 958 (1980), Justice White observed that
"[t] he informers in Adams and Draper were known to the officers and were
known to have provided reliable information in the past. The same cannot be
said to an anonymous tipster." Id. at 959 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Courts do not, of course, require "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" in order
to sustain a probable cause determination for the issuance of a search war-
rant: probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception." Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). See State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 773,
336 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1983). Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that the facts of
Gates, absent the knowledge that drugs and other illegal materials were dis-
covered when the warrants were served, would establish a probability of
criminal activity.
More importantly, as the conduct of the Omaha police in setting up their
controlled purchases in the Arnold case clearly demonstrates, the police have
ample means at their command to extend a criminal investigation and secure
undeniable evidence of overt criminal activity. As Justice Brennan has ob-
served: "jilt is unseemly at best for the Government to refrain from imple-
menting a simple, effective and unintrusive law enforcement device, and then
to argue to this Court that the absence of such a device justifies an unprece-
dented invasion of constitutionally guaranteed liberties." United States v.
Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct. 2573, 2590 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2361 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969).
124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 76-80 & 93-95 and accompanying text.
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and seizure law in Nebraska, it becomes at least arguable that it
was a mistake for the Nebraska court to apply the Gates standard
to the facts before it in Arnold, even as an afterthought. This is
particularly true given the Nebraska court's prior insistence that
constitutional rules be closely tied to the facts presented within a
given case. 126
The general principles that govern the issuance of warrants
have evolved over an extended period of time and have been fash-
ioned in a manner that will allow them to be applied to a variety of
situations. 2 7 Indeed, in many instances criticisms of Aguilar and
Spinelli reflect difficulties that have arisen because of the tensions
inherent within the application of general principles to particular
factual situations.128 In Gates, the conclusion is inescapable that
the facts before the magistrate, unlike those in Arnold, could be
characterized as indicia of criminal activities only if the anony-
mous informant is endowed with a presumption of credibility. The
Gates Court's determination that this was appropriate cannot be
reasonably divorced, however, from its after-the-fact knowledge
that the couple returned immediately to Bloomingdale and that
contraband was then found in their car and home.
In defending its holding, the Gates Court argued that the posi-
tions adopted by both the dissenting Justices and the Illinois
courts would "[leave I virtually no place for anonymous citizen in-
formants" within the law enforcement spectrum. 2 9
As an initial matter, it is difficult to see how the majority could
justify such a conclusion. Neither the Illinois courts nor the dis-
126. See supra note 66.
127. Much of the current debate about the fourth amendment centers upon com-
peting perceptions of the value of "rigid" versus "flexible" tests. Proponents
of a "flexible" approach generally premise their argument upon the need to
avoid "strictures that ... seriously [impede] the task of law enforcement
.... " Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Those who would retain a
more structured series of tests believe that a failure to do so "leaves no work-
able guidelines either for the police or for those who seek legal redress after
their rights have been violated." Countryman, Search and Seizure in a Sham-
bles? Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold of Justice Douglas, 64
IOWA L. REV. 435, 459 (1979).
128. Justice White appears to make this point in his opinions dissenting from the
denial of petitions for writs of certiorari in the companion cases of White v.
United States and Anderson v. United States, 454 U.S. 924 (1981): "While the
determination of reasonable suspicion is heavily dependent on the specificity
of the information, the amount of verification, and the urgency of a particular
situation, the conflicting results cannot be explained as accounting for differ-
ent factual patterns." Id. at 926 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). The question that
Justice White wished to address was "whether an anonymous tip may fur-
nish reasonable suspicion for an investigatory detention." Id. at 924. Justice
White was joined in these opinions by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
129. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983).
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senting Justices asserted that anonymous tips have no value or
should be preemptorily rejected. Rather, they insisted that such
information be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny than would
be appropriate when the record demonstrated the informant's reli-
ability and basis of knowledge. Certainly, given the traditional dis-
trust of hearsay evidence, which provided the analytic foundations
for the Court's pre-Aguilar rulings, the requirement that an anony-
mous tip be rigorously evaluated is not unreasonable. As one com-
mentator has noted:
[a] tip from an anonymous informant is presumptively unreliable because
the police and the magistrate cannot know the motives of the anonymous
informant-he may be motivated by a sense of civic duty, revenge, or a
desire to eliminate criminal competition.... The motives of anonymous
informants may include harassment of a neighbor or a racial minority.13 0
In addition, the assertion that a revised standard is required to
preserve a place for anonymous informants fails to accommodate
in any meaningful fashion the serious reservations expressed by
Justices White and Brennan. While concurring with the result
reached by the Court, Justice White expressed a fear that the re-
vised standard provides magistrates and police with no meaningful
guidance.13 1 And in dissent, Justice Brennan argued that there is
"a need to structure the inquiry in an effort to insure greater
accuracy."13
2
The majority's willingness to vest broad discretion in the au-
thorities is perhaps a commendable exercise in good faith. The
dangers implicit within the Gates holding are, however, aptly illus-
trated by the gloss placed upon a "totality of the circumstances"
standard by the State of Illinois when it argued in Gates that:
As applied to the instant case the proposed standard yields a fairly
simple and straightforward question for decision: Whether, based on the
totality of the circumstances and judged by the factual and practical con-
siderations of everyday life, could [the magistrate] reasonably conclude
that Lance Gates was probably bringing drugs back from Florida, just as
the letter predicted. Put somewhat differently the question is: Based on
the totality of the circumstances in this particular case, could any reason-
able person think that Lance Gates was probably transporting drugs?
133
That is, when assessed within the confines of this revised standard,
the "reasonable" determination of any individual that probable
cause existed should be accepted. Such a framework reduces legal
130. Comment, supra note 23, at 107 (footnotes omitted).
131. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2350-51 (1983) (White, J., concurring). Justice
White has expressed similar concerns in the past. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois,
439 U.S. 128, 168 (1978) (White, J., dissenting) (revised approach to issue of
standing "will not provide law enforcement officers with a bright line be-
tween the protected and the unprotected").
132. Id. at 2355 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Petitioner's Reply Brief on Reargument at 2 (emphasis in original).
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determinations of the utmost importance to what amounts to a
"lowest common denominator" jurisprudence.
Moreover, the three hypothetical situations posed by the Court
to illustrate the value of its holding do not support its analysis. In
Gates there was neither a "particular informant ... known for the
unusual reliability of his predictions of certain types of criminal
activities" 3 4 nor an "unquestionably honest citizen."' 35 Nor did
the anonymous informant whose credibility and reliability were
questioned provide "a statement that the event was observed first-
hand, entitl [ing] his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be
the case." 136 Rather, the Court sustained a determination of prob-
able cause based upon information received from a totally anony-
mous source, corroborated only by the facially innocent travels of
Lance Gates.
Viewed in this context, the Gates majority's argument that
lower courts will continue to require that affidavits present indica-
tions of informant "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" is uncon-
vincing. That was simply not the case in Gates. Accordingly, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to believe that lower courts will hold
themselves to a more stringent analytic standard than that em-
ployed by the Court itself when it promulgated the revised test.
3 7
2. Arnold and Gates: The Respective Courts' Treatment of
Prior Case Law
In Arnold, the Nebraska Supreme Court examined carefully
the applicable legal tests and reached a reasoned conclusion that
the affidavit fell within their parameters. No alteration of the prior
tests was required to sustain Ms. Arnold's conviction-a fact that
the court acknowledged.138 This was not possible in Gates. The
affidavit would not pass muster under the Aguilar/Spinelli formu-
lation, and it was necessary for the Court to abandon these hold-
ings in order to justify its reversal of the Illinois courts.
In arguing for its result in Gates, the United States Supreme
Court advanced a second rationale, the need to escape "[t] he stric-
tures that inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged' test [which]
cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement."' 3 9
The Gates majority argued that lower courts have become overly
technical in their interpretation and application of Aguilar and
134. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2329 (1983).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2330.
137. One might, in this context, be tempted to argue that what was sauce for the
Supreme Goose will almost certainly be so for the deferential State Ganders.
138. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983).
139. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983) (citation omitted).
[Vol. 63:514
CLOSING THE GATES
Spinelli,140 and cited as proof of this point three cases "brought to
[the Court's] attention by the State [that] reflect a rigid applica-
tion of such rules."'41
As both Justice White and Justice Brennan properly noted, the
fact that some lower courts might have misapplied the Aguilar and
Spinelli standards does not in itself provide a compelling rationale
for rejecting them.42 More importantly, close scrutiny of the cited
cases does not verify the Court's analysis of them.1
43
In People v. Palanza,4 4 for example, the Court noted correctly
that the warrant was invalidated because "It]here is no indication
as to how the informant or for that matter any other person could
tell whether a white substance was cocaine and not some other
white substance such as sugar or salt."145 The majority in Gates
apparently believed that the Illinois court had engaged in an ex-
140. The majority stated that:
Unlike a totality of circumstances analysis, which permits a balanced
assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of relia-
bility (and unreliability) attending the informant's tip, the 'two-pro-
nged test' has encouraged an excessively technical dissection of
informants' tips, with undue attention being focused on isolated is-
sues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented
to the magistrate.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 (1983) (footnote omitted).
141. Id. at 2330 n.9.
142. Justice Brennan, for example, observed that "[ilt is no justification for re-
jecting them outright that some courts may have employed an overly techni-
cal version of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards ... ." Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. 2317,2358 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White argued only that
he was cognizant of "... the fact that some lower courts have been applying
Aguilar and Spinelli in an unduly restrictive manner." Id. at 2350-51 (White,
J., concurring) (emphasis added). However, Justice White's assertion that
"[t]he holdings in these cases could easily be disapproved without reliance
on a 'totality of the circumstances' analysis," id. at 2350 n.26, is incorrect. See
infra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
143. This is not to say that there are not cases that might be cited as excellent
examples of an overly technical application of Aguilar and Spinelli. There
undoubtedly are. The question is whether they justify wholesale rejection of
the requirement in Aguilar and Spinelli that the magistrate be given certain
basic information about the informant and the presumptively criminal activi-
ties that the informant or police have, in theory, verified.
With regard to "technical" applications of the prior test, the Court empha-
sized, correctly, that only "some" of the information bearing upon each as-
pect of the Augilar/Spinelli test need be presented to the magistrate. Illinois
v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 n.6 (1983). This observation ignored the fact
that, in Gates, no information regarding the reliability or credibility of the
informant was available, and that the activities that the police could docu-
ment at the time that the warrant was sought were innocent on their face.
See supra notes 96-123 and accompanying text.
144. 55 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 371 N.E.2d 687 (1978).
145. Id. at 1030, 371 N.E.2d at 689. The affidavit specified that the informant "has
observed cocaine on numerous occasions in the past and is thoroughly famil-
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cessively technical application of Aguilar and Spinelli because it
gave no credence to the visual identification of cocaine by an indi-
vidual "familiar" with its appearance. The Illinois court did find
the affidavit deficient under the Aguilar and Spinelli tests.146
However, it went on to observe that:
Another facet of the case should be mentioned. When the motion to sup-
press the evidence was heard, the defendants called an Illinois Bureau of
Identification Criminalist who was familiar with narcotics prosecutions
and had often testified in behalf of the prosecution. This witness testified
that it was impossible to ascertain that a white substance was cocaine
merely from its appearance.14 7
In Palanza, then, the critical factor in the state's inability to meet
the requirements of Aguilar and Spinelli was its failure to over-
come testimony that undermined the reliability of the informant's
observations. This was a factual failure, rather than a barrier to
conviction erected by an overly stringent probable cause standard.
In People v. Brethauer14 8 an informant "known to be reliable"
provided detailed information, based upon personal observation,
regarding the location and nature of certain drugs.149 Once again,
the state court found the affidavit defective, and the Supreme
Court in Gates took exception with the court's conclusion.150
The point of emphasis for the Colorado Supreme Court was not,
however, the sort of mechanistic application of the principles of
Aguilar and Spinelli that the Gates Court sought to criticize.
iar with its appearance," and "also included facts relating to the informant's
credibility and reliability." Id. at 1029, 371 N.W.2d at 688.
146. Specifically, the court found that
Where, as in this case, the complaint not only refers to hearsay of an
informant, but also hearsay of a more remote informant unsubstanti-
ated and untested, it is difficult to conclude other than that the initial
facts of the informant demonstrate unreliability on the face of the
complaint. Accordingly, for these reasons alone we believe the ac-
tion of the trial court [to suppress] was proper.
Id. at 1032, 371 N.E.2d at 690.
147. Id. As Professor LaFave has noted:
[C]ourts, including the United States Supreme Court, seem to be-
lieve that if an informant says he "saw" a sale of narcotics, he has
demonstrated adequately his basis of knowledge even without any
explanation of how he knew that a sale was occurring or that the ob-
ject being sold was narcotic. Because even trained police sometimes
jump to the unwarranted conclusion that they have witnessed a drug
transaction, it is strange that such allegations by informants, which
are conclusory as to the most critical facts, should be so readily
accepted.
LaFave, supra note 81, at 39 (footnotes omitted).
148. 174 Colo. 29, 482 P.2d 369 (1971).
149. The affidavit alleged that the informant had purchased materials subse-
quently proven to be LSD and STP, had seen other drugs, and was told of
future drug transactions. Id. at 34, 482 P.2d at 371.
150. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 n.9 (1983).
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Rather, the Colorado court emphasized that its prior holding in
Hernandez v. People151 had made it clear that "[t]he Colorado
Constitution, Article II, Sec. 7 is even more restrictive and provides
that probable cause must be supported by oath or affirmation re-
duced to writing.'15 2 The Colorado court listed six specific defi-
ciencies15 3 in the affidavit in light of its pre-Aguilar/Spinelli
requirement that the "judge must look within the four corners of
the affidavit to determine whether there are grounds for the issu-
ance of a search warrant." 5 4 While closely tied to the basic re-
quirements of Aguilar and Spinelli, then, the critical element in
the court's determination that the evidence should have been sup-
pressed was the higher standard of proof grafted onto these tests
by the Colorado Constitution.
5 5
Finally, the Court criticized the standards used by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals when it affirmed the suppression of cer-
tain information secured from one of two suspects in an armed
robbery.1S6 The Texas court found that the affidavit "liberally con-
strued shows no more than a suspicion on the part of the informer
that these implements were kept where the appellant resided."1
57
Accordingly, the court believed that the affidavit failed the first re-
quirement of Aguilar: that "the magistrate must be informed of
some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant
concluded that the [evidence was] where he claimed .... -158
The admissions of a co-felon should, in the abstract, be ac-
corded a certain weight, and a rule that indiscriminately excludes
151. 153 Colo. 316, 385 P.2d 996 (1963).
152. Id. at 321, 385 P.2d at 999 (emphasis in original).
153. People v. Brethauer, 174 Colo. 29, 34-35, 482 P.2d 369, 371 (1971).
154. Id. at 39, 482 P.2d at 373-74 (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 37, 482 P.2d at 372.
156. Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The affidavit detailed
information "voluntarily" provided by Bridger's accomplice in the robbery of
a federal savings and loan. Id. at 803. The court found that the evidence
should not have been admitted, but sustained the conviction when it found
that this was "harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 805.
157. Id. at 803. The court first noted that the statement of the accomplice "Was not
attached and incorporated into the affidavit" and that "[i]f it had been it
might have supplied the deficiencies which we find in the affidavit." Id. This
paralleled, in many respects, the defect noted by the Court in Aguilar. See
supra note 80. The Texas court then determined that "[t]he magistrate issu-
ing the warrant was not informed of the underlying circumstances from
which the informant concluded that the named implements" were hidden in
the appellant's apartment, Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1974), and that at least one piece of evidence introduced at the trial "was
actually found on other premises after the appellant's apartment had been
searched." Id. at 803 n.2.
158. Id. at 803 (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964)).
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such information would be suspect.159 The Texas court believed
that the Bridger affidavit provided no indication of the basis for the
informant's belief and therefore failed to meet one of the basic re-
quirements of Aguilar.160 However, in reaching this holding, the
court prefaced its analysis by declaring that:
We do not intend to be overly strict or technical in our interpretation of
affidavits supporting search warrants, recognizing that they must be writ-
ten by working officers having limited time. We adhere to the common
sense interpretation of such affidavits, but in doing so we must stay within
the boundaries of constitutional requirements.
1 6 1
This application by the Texas court of a "non-technical, common
sense" approach to the evaluation of warrant affidavits appears to
fall squarely within the parameters of the test formulated by the
Court in Gates.162 The Texas court would, presumably, have
reached the same result in Bridger had the Gates ruling been
before it.163 Viewed in this light, it is difficult to see what the
Gates Court accomplished. 164
The majority's reasoning regarding "overly technical" lower
court readings of Aguilar and Spinelli was, therefore, suspect. As
indicated,165 there is reason to believe that courts will occasionally
employ excessively technical standards in assessing probable
cause. This possibility does not, however, establish a firm doctri-
159. The Gates Court's summary of Bridger stressed that the case dealt with "a
confession of armed robbery from one of two suspects in the robbery" and
receipt by the police of "$800 in cash stolen during the robbery." Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2330 n.9 (1983).
160. See supra note 11.
161. Bridger v. State, 503 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
162. That is, assuming that the Court was serious when it included a "basis of
knowledge" element within its test, see Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332
(1983), the Texas court could have concluded that this index of reliablity had
not been met.
163. The Texas court believed that it was utilizing a "non-technical, commonsense
standard." While there is room to quibble, the assertion in Gates that the
Bridger holding is "overly technical," would, presumably, be disputed by the
Texas court.
164. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did adopt the Gates standard in Bellah
v. State, 653 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). In a sharply worded dissent,
Judge Teague argued that the court had incorrectly refused to address the
appellant's claim of an independent state constitutional ground. Id. at 797-99
(Teague, J., dissenting). Accordingly, he believed that:
[Tihe cause should be remanded to the Court of Appeals for it to
reconsider ... in light of Gates and Texas law as it existed prior to
Aguilar v. Texas ... whether Texas law mandates that this Court
should adopt, as a matter of Texas Constitutional law, the principles
stated by the Supreme Court in Aguilar and Spinelli ....
Id. at 797 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
165. See supra note 143.
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nal basis for rejecting the previous test.166 Indeed, a careful exam-
ination of the cases cited by the Gates majority does not
substantiate the Court's contention that these cases document de-
ficiencies in the application of Aguilar and Spinelli. More impor-
tantly, the logic employed by the Bridger court belies the
assumption that an application of the Gates standard would have
altered the result in that case. Stripped of this justification, the
result in Gates may more clearly be seen for what it was: a judicial
tour de force, within which the end sought justified the means
employed.
IV. A NEW NEBRASKA STANDARD?
A. The Rationales Advanced in the ArnoM Concurrence
In Arnold, Judge White took issue with the majority on two
counts. First, he argued that the facts presented in the case fell
within the established tests. Consideration of the totality of cir-
cumstances formulation articulated in Gates was, accordingly, un-
necessary.167 This position is reasonable, given both the factual
distinctions between the two cases,168 and the extent to which the
Arnold affidavit relied upon the independent investigative activi-
ties of the police.169 Clearly, the Arnold court was not required to
go beyond its prior holdings and accept the Gates holding.170
166. This position is, presumably, one shared by both Justices White and Bren-
nan. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
167. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 774-75, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring).
168. See supra notes 93-137 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text.
170. The Aguilar/Spinelli standard sets a higher threshold than that adopted in
Gates, and the Court has ruled that "a state is free as a matter of its own law
to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to
be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original). Both the Nebraska court, see
supra note 22, and a number of other state supreme courts have indicated
that they do not feel bound by the rulings of the United States Supreme
Court when assessing the independent meaning of their own constitutional
guarantees. See, e.g., Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 733-34 (Alaska 1979) (re-
jecting the federal constitutional standard adopted in United States v. Robin-
son, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), for pre-incarceration inventory searches and
fashioning an independent state constitutional standard); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329-
31 (1975) (California Constitution poses higher standard than Robinson);
State v. Kaluna, 55 Hawaii 361, 371-72, 520 P.2d 51, 58-60 (1974) (rejecting the
federal constitutional standard of Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) and
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and using a state constitutional
basis to limit the scope of custodial searches); State v. Cutotta, 343 So. 2d 977,
981 (La. 1976) (acknowledging the express guarantee of third party standing
granted by the Louisiana Constitution); State v. Benoit, 417 A.2d 895, 899-901
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Whether it was wise for the Nebraska Court take this step is
less clear. Individual reactions to Arnold and Gates will depend in
large part upon the perspective that each person brings to the
question. The majority in Gates clearly favored the development
of a standard in fourth amendment inquiries that would give
greater latitude to police in their investigations.' 7 1 There are po-
tentially persuasive arguments in favor of such an approach, par-
ticularly if one brings to the analysis a sense that "technicalities"
should not stand in the way of the successful prosecution of "obvi-
ously" guilty individuals.172
Nevertheless, a careful examination of traditional fourth
amendment values tends to bear out Judge White's position in Ar-
nold. Initially, there is little doubt that the Gates "totality of cir-
cumstances" standard will provide less protection for the criminal
suspect than was previously available.173 However, even if that
(R.I. 1980) (rejecting the rationales of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975), and
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), regarding warrantless, delayed
searches); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 447-55, 450 A.2d 336, 346-50 (1982) (fash-
ioning a state constitutional basis for purging a tainted custodial
interrogation).
171. By arguing that "[t] he strictures that inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged
test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement. . .", Illi-
nois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983) (citations omitted), the Court ap-
pears to believe that the end sought must be allowed to sustain the means
employed. Indeed, it argued that unless the standard is lowered police might
well be tempted to "resort to warrantless searches, with the hope of relying
on consent or some other exception to the warrant clause that might develop
at the time of the search." Id. As the Court noted on another occasion, how-
ever, it is precisely the "predictability of those pressures that makes impera-
tive a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the Constitution extends to us
all." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977).
172. The public outcry against the use of "mere technicalities" to free those who
are "obviously guilty" often ignores the fact that the same prohibited police
conduct might be applied against "suspicious," but ultimately innocent, indi-
viduals. As Justice Douglas' observed in Draper:
[W]herever a culprit is caught redhanded, as in leading Fourth
Amendment cases, it is difficult to adopt and enforce a rule that
would turn him loose. A rule protective of law-abiding citizens is not
apt to flourish where its advocates are usually criminals. Yet the rule
we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike.
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 314 (1959) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
173. As Justice White noted, the "standard... does not expressly require ...
some showing of facts from which an inference may be drawn that the in-
formant is credible and that his information was obtained in a reliable way."
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2350 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
The lack of clear guidance on this point in the majority opinion is reflected
in the differing interpretations adopted by various state appellate courts.
Compare Lee v. State, 435 So. 2d 674, 676 n.1 (Miss. 1983) ("The Gates deci-
sion now provides that these factors should be considered, but that their
existence is not a necessary condition to establish probable cause.") with
Blue v. State, 441 So. 2d 165, 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Although with
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was not the avowed purpose of the Court, the holding on its face
substituted a standard that arguably provides magistrates with
less guidance when they are presented with those facts that the
authorities have assembled.
Justice White's concurring opinion in Gates is instructive on
this point. As he properly noted, the analytic focus for the Gates
Court shifted in large part to the accuracy, or lack thereof, of the
information supplied by the informant:
The critical issue is not whether the activities observed by the police are
innocent or suspicious. Instead, the proper focus should be on whether
the actions of the suspects, whatever their nature, give rise to an inference
that the informant is credible and that he obtained his information in a
reliable manner.174
The dangers implicit within this standard can be illustrated by
a hypothetical reconstruction of the Gates case. Angry or jealous
neighbors, hoping to rid the area of two individuals deemed, for
whatever reasons, "undesirable," send the anonymous letter to the
Bloomingdale police. These same neighbors have been given the
details of Lance's travel plans and have been asked by the unsus-
pecting couple, who have given them the keys, to watch their
home. Lance is put under surveillance. He departs, as predicted,
and meets his wife, who has been in Florida visiting relatives, per-
haps even Disney World. In the interim, contraband is planted
within the home by the neighbors, and is subsequently uncovered
by the police when the warrant is served.
Nothing within the revised standard would preclude such a se-
quence of events. The Gates, who have been effectively framed,
would have behaved in precisely the same way that they did under
the actual fact pattern. For, while the Court's opinion eliminates
the "rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every inform-
ant's tip,"'175 it provides no clear guidance for lower courts in deter-
mining precisely what sorts of information or informants will
satisfy its new, "nontechnical" standard:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affida-
vit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of per-
sons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 176
The language utilized in this test is, at best, imprecise, a fact high-
Gates's abandonment of the two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli 'verac-
ity' and 'basis of knowledge' are now merely circumstances, among others, to
be considered, they nonetheless must be considered.").
174. Id. 2348 (White, J., concurring).
175. Id. at 2328.
176. Id. at 2332.
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lighted by both Justices White17 7 and Brennan 7 8 when they ob-
served that the standard would provide little, if any, meaningful
guidance for police,179 magistrates,180 and reviewing courts.
In the best of worlds, the Gates standard poses serious
problems. The "best of worlds" is, however, often not the one
within which criminal defendants find themselves, particularly if
they are involved in the sale or distribution of drugs.181 As Justice
Brennan noted in his Gates dissent, "[w] ords such as 'practical,'
'nontechnical,' and 'commonsense,' as used in the Court's opinion
[have become] but code words for an overly permissive attitude
towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the
Fourth Amendment."'182
The majority responded that "[t] he task of this Court ... is to
'hold the balance [between individual rights and government au-
thority] true,' and we think we have done that in this case."' 83 The
flaws in the majority's treatment of the facts in Gates, however,
indicate otherwise.184 As applied by the Court, the revised test
tips the balance in probable cause determinations decidedly in
favor of the government. This was undeniably the Court's inten-
tion: statements found in Gates and other cases seem to indicate
that the Court is becoming much less vigilant when asked to pro-
tect the rights of individuals accused of narcotics violations. 85
177. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
179. As Professor Yackle has noted, however:. "Studies have shown that in prac-
tice judicial supervision is ineffective in any event. Generally, the police do
not seek warrants but act without them and request judicial approval only
after the fact." Yackle, supra note 6, at 414 (footnote omitted). To the extent
that these studies remain valid, the majority's argument in Gates that a con-
tinuation of the Aguilar/Spinelli standard will encourage warrantless
searches, see supra note 171, loses much of its force.
180. The ultimate value of having a clear and consistent standard for magistrates
will, of course, depend upon whether the magistrates treat seriously their re-
sponsibility to objectively assess the affidavits being presented to them. At
least one commentator has, however, observed that "[i]n the few cases in
which warrants are sought, they are usually issued perfunctorily by magis-
trates who see their task as merely rubber-stamping the judgments of law
enforcement officers. Indeed, in many cases the affidavits filed by police of-
ficers are note even read." Yackle, supra note 6, at 414.
181. See infra notes 185 & 250 and accompanying text.
182. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2359 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2333-34.
184. See generally supra notes 96-137 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980):
The public has a compelling interest in detecting those who would
traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit. Few problems affecting the
health and welfare of our population, particularly our young, cause
greater concern than the escalating use of controlled substances.
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized and conducted by sophis-
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A standard such as that employed in Gates might prove worka-
ble for a magistrate who insists that the affidavit provide certain
minimal indicia of the informant's "reliability" and "basis of
knowledge." Such information is not, however, required by the
standard.186 Absent some minimal objective requirements to
guide the assessment of the initial character of the informant's tip,
the dangers are immense that this evaluation process will be "en-
dowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of [an] informer's
tip."'8 7
More importantly, under the test formulated in Gates, a court
reviewing the magistrate's initial determination could justifiably
base its analysis on one simple question: was the informant right?
The answer to this question, which is asked only after incriminat-
ing evidence has been discovered, is to be found within the "total-
ity of the circumstances." The Gates majority stressed that "the
duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate
had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing] that probable cause
existed.' "188 Unfortunately, the Court's revised standard provides
no guidance as to the point at which the balance is tipped in favor
of the issuance of the warrant. Rather, lower courts are left with a
subjective standard that focuses, not upon the character of infor-
mants, but solely upon the accuracy of their tips. For all except
the magistrate who originally issued the warrant, this will be infor-
mation that the reviewing court will already know has proven to be
true.
Previous experiences with broad "totality of the circumstances"
ticated criminal syndicates. The profits are enormous. And many
drugs ... may be easily concealed. As a result, the obstacles to de-
tection of illegal conduct may be unmatched in any other area of law
enforcement.
Id. at 561-62 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun cited this argument
in support of his contention that "[g]iven the strength of society's interest in
overcoming the extraordinary obstacles to the detection of drug traffickers,
such conduct should not be subjected to a requirement of probable cause."
Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1332 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Prosecutors have apparently responded to this invitation. Each of the
search and seizure cases in which the Court issued a ruling during its Octo-
ber, 1983, Term were drug related, and each involved an appeal by the state of
an adverse judgment below. See supra note 12.
This phenomenon is not confined to the U.S. Supreme Court. Professor
Snowden has, for example, documented a similar antipathy to the rights of
defendants in "dope" cases in Nebraska. Snowden, A Holistic Jurispruden-
tial View of the Drug Victim, 54 NEB. L. REV. 350, 361-76 (1975).
186. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. As indicated, there is in addition
no real assurance that the authorities will be guided by the applicable test,
whatever it might be. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
187. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 418 (1969).
188. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983) (quoting Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
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standards in criminal procedure cases indicate that such standards
seldom work. For example, prior to the Court's landmark ruling in
Miranda v. Arizona,189 reviewing courts were to determine if there
was "a totality of circumstances evidencing an involuntary.. . ad-
mission of guilt."190 Various factors were to be taken into account,
including: the individual's state of mind and capacity for effective
choice;191 individual weaknesses or incapacities; 92 threats or im-
minent danger; 93 repeated or extended interrogation; 94 limits on
access to counsel or friends;195 and the length and illegality of the
detention under state law.1
96
This impressive array of specific touchstones was, in theory, to
be assessed within the "totality of the circumstances." 9 7 How-
ever, reviewing courts "did not take these factors into account very
much, nor were they required to."198 The Miranda ruling fol-
lowed.199 Since magistrates have in the past displayed a lack of
189. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
190. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). The totality of the circum-
stances test has been characterized as "an I know it when I see it' school of
jurisprudence." Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall
of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 793 (footnote omitted). The Court
has utilized a totality of the circumstances approach in a number of other
cases. See, e.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979) (question of
whether juvenile who asked to see probation officer, but not an attorney, has
waived Miranda rights to be "resolved on the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the investigation"); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227
(1973) (consent to search voluntary or product of duress or coercion "a ques-
tion of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances"). The
Schneckloth standard has been criticized as "likely to [produce] still another
series of fourth amendment cases in which the courts provide a lengthy fac-
tual description followed by a conclusion (most likely, in the current climate,
that consent was voluntarily given), without anything to connect the two."
Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 57
(1974).
191. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962).
192. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
193. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958).
194. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1940).
195. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
196. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
197. These touchstones offered a degree of specificity that is not, it should be em-
phasized, present in the Gates standard.
198. Supreme Court Review and Constitutional Law Symposium, 52 U.S.L.W.
2228, 2230 (Oct. 25, 1983) (remarks of Prof. Kamisar) (emphasis added). In a
similar vein, Professor LaFave, commenting upon the Gates test, noted that
"if one reflects on the experience under the other 'totality of the circum-
stances' test long used in confession cases, which both left the police without
needed guidance and impaired the effectiveness of judicial review, there is
certainly cause for concern." LaFave, Supreme Court Report: Nine key deci-
sions expand authority to search and seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1744 (1983).
199. In their dissenting opinions in Miranda, Justices Harlan and White objected
to the new standard in terms strikingly similar to those employed by individ-
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diligence when assessing warrant affidavits,200 the likelihood that
law enforcement officials will prove more conscientious under the
relaxed Gates standard is not great.2 01 Viewed in this light, Judge
White's observation in Arnold that "the bedrock of our federal con-
stitutional rights may only be a mass of shifting sand 202 merits
attention, and his proposal that Nebraska consider the develop-
ment of its own standard assumes a greater urgency.
B. A New Nebraska Standard
Article I, section 7, of the Nebraska Constitution 203 provides a
firm state basis for a Nebraska search and seizure standard. Aside
from its attempt to evade the mandates of Weeks, 204 the Nebraska
Supreme Court has not distinguished the guarantees of Article I,
section 7, from those of the fourth amendment. Nevertheless, the
court has made it clear that this section of the Nebraska Constitu-
tion carries independent force,205 and that the Nebraska court will,
as a general rule, reserve the right to construe its own constitution
in the manner in which it sees fit.206
uals seeking to lower current search and seizure guidelines. Justice Harlan,
for example, argued that "the Court is taking a real risk with society's welfare
in imposing its new regime on the country. The social costs of crime are too
great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation." Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 517 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice
White stated that "[t] he rule announced today will measurably weaken the
ability of the criminal law to perform [its] tasks." Id. at 541 (White, J., dis-
senting). These fears have, in large part, proven to be groundless. See also
Y. KAMSAR, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, in POLICE INTER-
ROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAw AND POLCY (1980); Schulhofer,
Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 869-72 (1981) (summarizing
Professor Kamisar's analysis of the flaws in the approach of the Miranda
dissents).
200. See supra notes 179-80.
201. The Court in Gates argued that "[t] he diversity of informants' tips, as well as
the usefulness of the totality of the circumstances approach to probable
cause is reflected in our prior decisions on the subject." Illinois v. Gates, 103
S. Ct. 2317, 2329 n.7 (1983). As Justice Brennan observed: "Only one of the
cases cited by the Court ... was decided subsequent to Aguilar ... [T]hey
are not inconsistent with Aguilar." Id. at 2357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In
many respects, the fact that informant tips are so diverse would argue for the
imposition of a framework to guide the magistrate's inquiry and to insure
that all parties proceed from with a common, objective set of assumptions the
extent to which such tips are to be accepted.
202. State v. Arnold, 214 Neb. 769, 775, 336 N.W.2d 97, 100 (1983) (White, J.,
concurring).
203. For the text of Art. I, § 7, see supra note 22.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Other state supreme courts have reached similar conclusions. See supra
note 170. In some instances this result has been dictated by the terms of the
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The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "a state is
free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on
police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards. ' '2 07 The Court's recent holding in
Michigan v. Long208 indicates, however, that states electing to do
so must proceed with great care. In Long, the petitioner argued
that "the Michigan courts have provided greater protection from
searches and seizures under the state constitution than is afforded
under the Fourth Amendment, and the references to the state con-
stitution therefore establish an adequate and independent ground
for the decision below."209
The Long Court rejected petitioner's claim.210 The majority
reasoned that:
when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the
adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear
from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable expla-
nation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it be-
lieved that federal law required it to do so.
2 1 1
The Court then indicated that it would respect a state court's de-
termination that its ruling did not "rest primarily on federal law"
only when "the state court decision indicates clearly and expressly
that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and
independent [state] grounds .... -212
state constitution itself. The California Constitution, for example, stipulates
that "[r]ights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those
guaranteed by the United States Constitution." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
But cf. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12. It should be noted that in Florida a constitu-
tional amendment approved by popular vote incorporated into that provision
the requirement that the Florida courts read art. I, § 12 "in conformity with
the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court." Id. Chief Justice Burger has noted this de-
velopment with approval. See infra note 215.
207. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis in original).
208. 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983).
209. Id. at 3474.
210. Specifically, the Court found that "[a]part from its two citations to the state
constitution, the court below relied exclusively on its understanding of [Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)] and other federal cases." Id. at 3477 (emphasis in
original).
211. Id. at 3476.
212. Id. The Court indicated that "[i]f a state court chooses merely to rely on
federal precedents as it would on the precedents of all other jurisdictions,
then it need only make clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion
that federal cases are being used only for the purpose of guidance." Id. Con-
sistent with this doctrine, the Oregon Supreme Court recently stated that,
"[1] est there be any doubt about it, when this court cites federal opinions in
interpreting a provision of Oregon law, it does so because it finds the views
expressed there persuasive, not because it considers itself bound to do so by
its understanding of federal doctrines." State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, _ 666
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Some commentators have expressed the fear that this holding
portends an "increased... penetration of federal review into state
judicial systems." 2 13 Such a result would clearly be of concern,
particularly for states such as South Dakota that have chosen to
"evade" decisions of the Burger Court through a declaration that a
previously "unacceptable" ruling might be justified on the basis of
the state constitution.214 Nevertheless, the language of the Long
decision does not appear to support the contention that state court
rulings will inevitably be subjected to substantive review by the
Supreme Court, and the lesson of Long may well be confined to a
simple requirement that state rulings claiming an independent
state constitutional basis be carefully crafted.
215
Given the flaws in Gates, careful consideration should be given
to the development of a state constitutional standard for probable
cause determinations in Nebraska. As an initial matter, such a
standard should require, rather than simply permit, magistrates to
have before them sufficient information to determine that a
probability of criminal activity exists. In the majority of cases, this
P.2d 1316, 1321 (1983). See also State v. Ball, - N.H. , 471 A.2d 347, 352 (1983)
(court to rely on federal precedents "merely for guidance and do not consider
our own results bound by these decisions").
213. Tribe, NAT. L.J., Aug. 1, 1983, at 5, col. 2.
214. See, e.g., State v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 675 (S.D. 1976), holding that
"[w]e find that logic and a sound regard for the purposes of the protection
afforded by the S.D. Const. Art. VI, § 11 warrant a higher standard of protec-
tion for the individual in this instance than the United States Supreme Court
found necessary [in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)] under
the Fourth Amendment." Professor Wilkes characterized such actions as a
"new federalism" marked by "state court evasion," and has argued that
"[w] hile it might be possible for the Burger Court to curtail some of the eva-
sion by altering the adequate state ground doctrine, the Court does not ap-
pear likely to do so." Wilkes, The New Federalism Revisited, supra note 24, at
751. This no longer appears to be the case.
215. It should be noted, however, that the Chief Justice gave notice well before
Long that decisions claiming an adequate and independent state ground
would be subjected to more intense scrutiny. In Florida v. Casal, 103 S. Ct.
3100 (1983), the Court dismissed its writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted, stating that "the judgment of the court below [apparently] rested on
independent and adequate state grounds." Id. However, the Chief Justice
felt compelled to issue a concurring opinion, within which he noted that
"[t]he Florida Supreme Court did not expressly declare that its holding
rested on state grounds, and the principle state case cited for the probable
cause standard ... is based entirely upon this Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Id. at 3101 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). And, in a not terribly subtle hint to states seeking to retain
more restrictive search and seizure standards, the Chief Justice noted that
"[t]he people of Florida have since shown acute awareness of the means to
prevent . . . inconsistent interpretations of the two constitutional provi-
sions," through their amendment of art. I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution. Id.
See supra note 214.
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threshold will be easily met. It will only be in those few instances
where the magistrate is required to assess activities that are argua-
bly innocent that problems will arise.2 16 This will be particularly
true when the affidavit is based, in any significant degree, on infor-
mation supplied by informants.
As indicated, three different types of informants have been dis-
tinguished.2 17 For the first of these, the concerned citizen, Ne-
braska has formulated a Nebraska specific standard of
presumptive reliability.218 In reaching this determination the
court stressed that it was speaking of the "citizen informer, whose
only motive is to help law officers in the suppression of crime. .. "
and who "unlike the professional informant ... is without motive
to exaggerate, falsify or distort the facts to serve his own ends."
2 1 9
Where, as in Arnold, citizen informants have identified themselves
to the police, a presumption of reliability of this sort is clearly
warranted.
This would not be the case when dealing with either a "confi-
dential" or "anonymous" informant. Generally, such an individual:
is likely to be a person in the underworld or a person on its periphery; in
its confidence, or so much "a part of the scenery" to the criminal that this
person is in a particularly good position to know the story of a crime com-
mitted, the story of criminal business done, being transacted or proposed
for the future; or at least he gets significant bits of information which,
when placed in context by the investigator, will demonstrate an accurate
picture of crime... On this basis, then, our informer is likely himself to
be a criminal. If not, he might be at least an associate of criminals. Or if
he is merely in touch with criminals by reason of association, location or
occupation, he might, nevertheless, be considered to be a person who
would identify himself with these people rather than with the forces of the
law. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that this person would
require a considerable degree of motivation before he would find himself
willing to assist in the prosecutive endeavors of law enforcement.
2 20
216. Strict adherence to a standard that permitted a reviewing court to have
before it only that information that was available to the magistrate would
eliminate most, if not all, of the difficulties. Unfortunately, the very act of
requesting that evidence be suppressed carries with it the implication that
criminal activities have, in fact, been uncovered.
217. See supra note 23.
218. See, e.g., State v. Ybanez, 210 Neb. 42, 44, 313 N.W.2d 30, 31 (1981).
219. State v. King, 207 Neb. 270, 274, 298 N.W.2d 168, 171 (1980) (one judge opinion)
(quoting State v. Drake, 224 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Iowa 1974)). As indicated, the
full court subsequently adopted the rationale advanced in King in Ybanez,
and in Butler. See supra note 23. In King, Chief Justice Krivosha began his
analysis of applicable case law with a quotation from Aguilar, and cited a
number of federal cases. The ultimate adoption by the full court of a pre-
sumption of reliability for citizen informants was, however, predicated upon
its acceptance of the reasoning utilized by the Iowa Supreme Court. This
approach would, presumably, pass muster under Long as an independent
state restriction.
220. M. HARNEY & J. CROss, THE INFORMER IN LAw ENFORCEMENT 40 (2d ed. 1968).
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As this definition indicates, there is a presumption that an inform-
ant is sufficiently close to criminal activities to witness or be aware
of them. At the same time, an informant's intimate association
with criminals makes it likely that this individual is, in turn, un-
trustworthy. This creates a dilemma for law enforcement officials:
the information that they must utiliize in the pursuit of crime may
itself be the product of criminal activities.
Given these realities, the wisdom of continuing to require that
informants reveal a basis of knowledge and demonstrate their
credibility and reliability is evident. This will be particularly true
where, as was the case in Gates, the informant is anonymous.
22 1
This requirement assumes added force if, as is apparently the
case, it remains the position of the Court that, by "expressly reaf-
firm[ing]... the validity of cases such as Nathanson,"222 it contin-
ues to be the rule that "no matter how reliable the affiant-officer
may be, a warrant should not be issued unless the affidavit dis-
closes supporting facts and circumstances." 2 23 As Justice White
noted in Gates, "[i]t would be 'quixotic' if a ... statement from an
honest informant, but not one from an honest officer, could furnish
probable cause [while] we have repeatedly held that the unsup-
ported assertion or belief of an officer does not satisfy the probable
cause requirement."
224
Prior to Arnold, the LeDent test22 5 provided a framework within
which magistrates in Nebraska could assess whether the affidavit
met minimal objective standards. Admittedly, the ruling in
LeDent evolved from the standards set in Aguilar and Spinelli.
However, unlike many of its counterparts in other states, it does
not appear that the Nebraska court became bogged down in elabo-
rate explications of the nuances of various "prongs" of the test.
221. As indicated, the test adopted in Gates is not, however, applicable only to
affidavits based on information secured from anonymous informants. See
supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
222. The reference is to Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), in which
the Court held that "an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a
private dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts or cir-
cumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere affirmance of
belief or suspicion is not enough." Id. at 47.
223. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2350 (1983) (White, J., concurring). See also
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), where Justice White observed
that "[t]he unsupported assertion or belief of the officer does not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause." Id. at 423 (White, J., concurring). In making
this point, Justice White cited Jones v. United States, 363 U.S. 257, 269 (1960),
one of the cases utilized by the majority in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S Ct. 2317,
2329 n.7 (1983), to verify the "usefulness of the totality of the circumstances
approach to probable cause ... ." Id.
224. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2350 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
225. See supra note 74 for the text of the LeDent test.
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Rather, the standard appears to have been treated in what one
might characterize as a "commonsense, nontechnical" fashion. At
the same time, it respected the need for magistrates and reviewing
courts to have available the sort of structure that generated consis-
tent standards and a common frame of reference.
A Nebraska specific standard for probable cause inquiries
should, then, incorporate the following requirements:
1. a presumption of reliability when the informant is an identified, con-
cerned citizen who comes forward voluntarily with information;
2. a requirement that, where the information is supplied by a "confiden-
tial" informant, the officer requesting the warrant document, in the af-
fidavit, facts from which the magistrate may determine what the basis
of knowledge is and that the informant is credible and reliable;
3. where the affidavit must rely upon anonymous tips, or where, for
whatever reason, the officers cannot establish that the informant is
credible and has an express basis of knowledge, a requirement that
any corroborating information be of incriminating details from which
the magistrate may conclude that there is a probability of expressly
criminal activities.
In order to pass muster under Long, such a standard will need
to be adopted with language that expressly states that it is based
upon the independent guarantees of Article I, section 7, of the Ne-
braska Constitution. Admittedly, the standard draws, in large part,
upon prior case law reflective of the tests that originated with the
Aguilar ruling. Nevertheless, the elements of the test expand
upon previous rulings, and, in particular, offer an escape from the
confusion generated by the utilization of Draper in Spinelli, and
the subsequent misinterpretations of Draper in cases such as
Gates .226
The prospects for eventual acceptance of such a standard in Ne-
braska should be greatly enhanced as the legal community be-
comes more familiar with the details and implications of Gates. It
is, for example, noteworthy that the Nebraska Supreme Court's ac-
ceptance of Gates in Arnold appears to have been predicated upon
the assumption that Gates merely "relaxed somewhat" the "rules
relating to affidavits used to obtain search warrants. '227 That was
clearly not the case, and a careful examination of Gates and the
difficulties inherent within the revised standard argue for a rejec-
tion of Arnold in favor of a more stringent standard predicated
upon the guarantees of Article I, section 7.
Nor is it unlikely that the Nebraska court would adopt a revised,
226. See supra notes 110-19 and accompanying text.
227. State v. Gilreath, 215 Neb. 466, 468, 339 N.W.2d 288, 291 (1983). The court's
acceptance of Gates may also be another indication of the problems that are
imposed by its workload, the sheer volume of which may operate to occasion-
ally preclude extended examination of the true implications of decisions by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
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state-specific standard if given the opportunity to do so. Judge
White, joined by Judge Shanahan, argued in Arnold against pre-
cipitous acceptance of Gates and for a Nebraska standard. Chief
Justice Krivosha has, on previous occasions, declared that the
court should not decide questions of constitutional law that have
not been fully briefed and argued.228 Writing for the majority in
State v. Tweedy, 229 Judge Hastings has noted that the court has on
occasion been reluctant to follow completely the criminal proce-
dure holdings of the United States Supreme Court.
2 30
Moreover, a careful examination of previous opinions by Judge
McCown,23 1 who authored the majority opinion in Arnold, seems
to indicate that the main impetus for acceptance of Gates was an
unfortunate deference to the dictates of the Burger Court. Judge
McCown's dissenting opinion in State v. Bernth 232 is noteworthy in
this regard. Bernth involved a conviction for possession of mari-
juana and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. In its
decision, the court examined the sufficiency of an affidavit that re-
lied upon the uncorroborated assertions of a "concededly reliable
informant." 233 In arriving at its conclusion that the warrant should
be sustained, the majority reasoned:
228. State v. Vicars, 207 Neb. 325, 336, 299 N.W.2d 421, 428 (1980) (Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring). See supra note 66.
229. 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
230. The specific issue in question was the applicability to misdemeanors of the
holding in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (record must disclose that
guilty plea was knowingly and intelligently entered). Writing for the major-
ity, Judge Hastings noted that "[t]his court has been reluctant to embrace
unequivocally the specific holding of Boykin" but that it had adopted Boykin
"in principle." State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. 649, 652, 309 N.W.2d 94, 96 (1981).
231. Judge McCown has since retired and has been replaced by Judge Grant.
232. 196 Neb. 813, 246 N.W.2d 600 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 948 (1977). Judge
Newton wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Paul W.
White and Judges Spencer, Boslaugh, and Brodkey. Judges McCown and
Clinton filed separate dissenting opinions. Of the seven, only Judge Bos-
laugh remains on the court.
The Bernth decision has been criticized. See Comment, Nebraska Stan-
dards, supra note 69, at 610-12; Note, Use of Informant's Tips in Establishing
Probable Cause, 56 NEB. L. REV. 883 (1977).
233. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 815, 246 N.W.2d 600, 601 (1976). The affidavit
stated:
That on the 2nd day of April, 1975, Affiant was advised by an in-
formant in oral conversation of the following: That on the 29th day of
March, 1975, said informant had a personal conversation with suspect
and was advised by suspect that suspects had pounds of grass for
sale.
That on the 3rd day of April, 1975, Officer Brad Brush of the Grand
Island Police Department advised Affiant that he had accompanied
informant on said date in a motor vehicle during which time inform-
ant pointed out the above address as suspect's residence.
Brief of Appellant at 6. The Affiant then stipulated that, based solely upon
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a magistrate [should consider] known facts and common-sense probabili-
ties. Controlled substances are of considerable value on the street, much
sought after by users, and, unless kept in a safe place, subject to theft.
Wide experience over the years has demonstrated that such items are
usually kept in a dealer's place of residence and under constant surveil-
lance or supervision. The defendant was obviously a dealer. He had
pounds of marijuana. Such a quantity would not be carried on his person
or left unprotected in an automobile. Where then does logic and common
sense dictate that it would be kept? There is only one answer, his resi-
dence. A magistrate is not required to ignore the lessons of experience or
to disregard logic and common sense.
2 3 4
The majority opinion contained no direct references to the test
established in LeDent, and relied in large part upon the holding in
United States v. Ventresca 235 that warrants be evaluated in a "com-
monsense" rather than "hypertechnical" manner. Judge McCown
criticized this failure to adhere to established standards, noting
that "[t] here is no case cited in the majority opinion, nor have we
found one anywhere, in which the affidavit for the search warrant
contained nothing more than the bare report of an informer that a
suspect had stated that he had contraband." 236
In many respects, the Bernth holding depended upon, but did
not expressly articulate, a "totality of the circumstances" ap-
proach.237 It was perhaps for this reason that Judge McCown de-
these facts, he "has reason to and does believe" that the marijuana would be
found in Benth's residence. Id. at 14.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge McCown noted that "[t]he affidavit here
recited a bare conclusion reflecting only suspicion" and "recited none of the
underlying circumstances from which either the informer or the affiant con-
cluded that the marijuana was located in the residence of the defendant."
State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 820, 246 N.W.2d 600, 604 (1976) (McCown, J., dis-
senting). Judge Clinton's brief dissent also emphasized the failure of the affi-
davit to recite any "of the underlying circumstances ...... Id. at 821, 246
N.W.2d at 604 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
The affidavit in Bernth contained less detail than the anonymous letter in
Gates, see supra note 92, although it does have the "virtue" of having been
predicated upon information supplied by a "reliable informant" rather than
an anonymous correspondent.
234. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 817, 246 N.W.2d 600, 602-03 (1976). The majority's
emphasis upon the security interests involved, and the concommitant as-
sumption that the drugs would be found in the defendant's home, is particu-
larly ironic in light of the debate in Gates regarding whether Susan Gates
would have left the Gates residence unguarded if drugs were stored there, as
the anonymous letter predicted. See supra note 101.
235. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
236. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 819, 246 N.W.2d 600, 603 (1976) (McCown, J.,
dissenting).
237. The Bernth ruling has not been cited in subsequent search and seizure cases
as a basis for sustaining a warrant that did not fall within the tests articulated
in Aguilar, Spinelli, and LeDent. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 199 Neb. 165, 256
N.W.2d 678 (1977), in which Bernth is cited only for the proposition that war-
rants be assessed in a "commonsense" manner, id. at 169, 256 N.W.2d at 680,
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clared that "[t] he majority opinion here goes far beyond any prior
decisions of this court, or of any other court, in emasculating the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures, 238 and argued forcefully that the clear and previously
authoritative requirements of Aguilar and LeDent had not been
met.239 Viewed within the context of Judge McCown's dissent in
Bernth, it would appear that the court's willingness to adopt the
Gates standard in Arnold reflected a deference to the dictates of
the Burger Court that was, given the realities of Gates,
misplaced.2
40
and Aguilar is cited as the source of the "tests for determining the validity of
an affidavit. . . ." Id. at 168, 256 N.W.2d at 680.
Clearly, the court in Arnold did not believe that the long established tests
had, at that point in time, been discarded.
238. State v. Bernth, 196 Neb. 813, 819, 246 N.W.2d 600, 603 (1976) (McCown, J., dis-
senting). In language strikingly similar to that employed by Judge White in
his Arnold concurrence, Judge McCown concluded his dissent with these
words:
The decision of this court effectively destroys the protection af-
forded to every citizen under the specific terms of the Constitution of
the United States and the Constitution of Nebraska. It also sets out a
new and unique basis for determining what constitutes probable
cause for the issuance of a search warrant. If the home of any citizen
is open to police search whenever a reliable informer reports that the
citizen made a statement implicating himself in the possession of il-
legal substances or things, the dread spectre of a police state is all
too close and real. Constitutional freedoms should never be so easily
discarded.
Id. at 821, 246 N.W.2d at 604 (McCown, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 819-20, 246 N.W.2d at 603-04 (McCown, J., dissenting). Judge McCown
also took issue with the majority's conclusion that the defendant was obvi-
ously a dealer," id. at 817, 246 N.W.2d at 602, stating that:
If that be true, then the same conclusion would necessarily follow as
to any citizen who was reliably reported to have made the same
statement, even if the statement was made in jest. As the trial court
said at the original suppression hearing: "Well, I guess I'd better not
tell anyone that I have marijuana in my home, or I may be invaded by
the police."
Id. at 820, 246 N.W.2d at 604 (McCown, J., dissenting).
240. The reaction to Gates in those other jurisdictions that have considered it has
been mixed. Some state appellate courts have embraced the revised test
with enthusiasm. See, e.g., State v. Lang, 105 Idaho 683, 684, 672 P.2d 561, 562
(1983) ("unduly technical" standard of Aguilar-Spinelli abandoned in favor
of Gates); State v. Erler, - Mont. _ ., 672 P.2d 624, 627 (1983) ('The ab-
surdly technical aspects of the previous test are thus abandoned."); Bon-
sness v. State, 672 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1983) (Wyoming had never expressly
adoptedAguilar-Spinelli, and now rejects "technical and rigid" requirements
in favor of Wyoming law and Gates). Other courts have adopted Gates, but
expressed a need to approach the revised standard with caution. See, e.g.,
State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, _ 311 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1984) (Gates a "rule of
subjectivity"; should be considered the "outer limit of probable cause," with
"supporting affidavits [to] reflect the maximum indication of reliability, along
the lines of Aguilar-Spinelli, wherever and whenever that shall be feasible");
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The problems inherent in the standard promulgated in Gates,
and accepted in Arnold, are such that serious consideration should
be given to the development of an independent Nebraska standard
for probable cause determinations. Obviously, certain elements of
this Article's argument for such a change reflect a considered judg-
State v. Arrington, - N.C. App. _ __. 311 S.E.2d 33, 35 (1984) ("Gates, while
strong medicine in the noble fight to discourage excessively technical dissec-
tions of informant's tips, is not a panacea."); State v. Ricci, 471 A.2d 291, 296
(RI. 1984) (Rhode Island applications of Aguilar-Spinelli had not been "un-
duly technical," and "principles that have controlled our determinations re-
main valid in light of Gates"); State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1983)
("However, even under this standard, compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli
guidelines may be necessary to make a sufficient basis for probable cause.").
The majority of the courts that have addressed the question have adopted
Gates. Only one state, New York, has expressly refused to follow Gates and
has adhered to its own previously adopted state constitutional standard.
People v. Landy, 59 N.Y.2d 369, 375 n.*, 452 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 n.*, 465 N.Y.S.2d
857, 860 n.* (1983). A number of state court judges have, however, argued for
consideration of an independent state law standard as a substitute for the
Gates test. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 273-74, 658 S.W.2d 350,
354 (1983) (Purtle, J., concurring) (independent standard under Arkansas
Rules of Criminal Procedure not abrogated; consideration of Gates inappro-
priate); People v. Exline, 98 Ill. 2d 150, _ 456 N.E.2d 112, 116 (1983)
(Goldenhersch, J., dissenting) ("We are not required to blindly follow the
actions taken by the Supreme Court in determining the standards applicable
to our own constitution ... I would retain [Aguilar and Spinelli I as constitu-
tional requirements in Illinois."); Commonwealth v. Gray, - Pa. Super. _ -
469 A.2d 169, 176 (1983) (Brosky, J., concurring) (while not expressing an
opinion as to retaining Aguilar-Spinelli, "the people of this Commonwealth
would have been better served by a consideration of this option"); Bellah v.
State, 653 S.W.2d 795, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J., dissenting)
(would remand to lower court "to decide whether Texas law mandates that
this Court should adopt, as a matter of Texas Constitutional law, the princi-
ples stated by the Supreme Court in Aguilar and Spinelli").
One state court has expressly considered, and rejected, the issue of an
independent state constitutional guarantee. Beemer v. Commonwealth, 665
S.W.2d 912, 915 (Ky. 1984) (fully in accord with Gates; do not retain Aguilar-
Spinelli as matter of state constitutional interpretation). Most courts have
simply adopted Gates as a matter of federal constitutional law. See, e.g.,
State v. Espinosa-Gamez, 678 P.2d 1379, 1384 (Ariz. 1984) (Gates controlling,
and is retroactive); State v. Luter, 346 N.W.2d 802, 807-08 (Iowa 1984) ("sub-
stantial change" of Gates now controlling); State v. Walter, 234 Kan. 78, 670
P.2d 1354 (1983) (Gates adopted, per discussion in State v. Rose, 8 Kan. App.
2d 659, 665 P.2d 1111 (1983)); State v. Lingle, 436 So. 2d 456, 460 (La. 1983)
(adopt the "non-technical, commonsense" standard of Gates); Ramia v.
State, 57 Md. App. 654, _ 471 A.2d 1064, 1064-65 (1984) (adopting Gates); State
v. Gilmore, 665 S.W.2d 25,28 (Mo. App. 1984) (totality of the circumstances as
standard); Lee v. State, 435 So. 2d 674, 676 (Miss. 1983) (adopting Gates);
State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (Utah 1983) (abandon rigid two-prong
test and reaffirm totality of the circumstances); State v. Doucette, 143 Vt. 573,
585, 470 A.2d 676, 684 (1983) (test announced in Gates applicable); State v.
Boggess, 115 Wis. 443, 453-54, 340 N.W.2d 516, 522-23 (1983) (in assessing prob-
able cause, totality of circumstances to be considered).
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ment that the dangers posed by the Gates standard should not be
tolerated by a citizenry that is sensitive to the guarantees set forth
in the Nebraska and federal constitutions. Nevertheless, the aura
of uncertainty that hovers over the Gates test is a cause for serious
concern on the part of all citizens.
The inherently subjective nature of the Gates test makes it sus-
ceptible to manipulation by those at either end of the legal spec-
trum. Both "liberals" and "conservatives" can read into the test
what they will. As a result, the law governing probable cause de-
terminations runs the risk of being reduced to a potentially incon-
sistent sequence of individual judicial determinations. 241 The
Nebraska court's adoption of Gates in Arnold was unfortunate,




One of the key premises in Judge White's concurring opinion is
undoubtedly correct: recent decisions by the United States
Supreme Court have cut back the protections once afforded by the
fourth amendment.243 The composition of the current Court, and
its expressed intentions, make it likely that this trend will
241. One state court judge confronted by the Gates ruling emphasized the volatile
nature of criminal procedure jurisprudence during the past two decades in
support of his argument for consideration of a standard based upon the guar-
antees of the state constitution. See Bellah v. State, 653 S.W.2d 795, 798 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1983) (Teague, J., dissenting).
242. The critical question, however, is not whether it was within the court's power
to adopt the Gates standard. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
Rather, the issue is whether it was wise to do so in such a precipitious
manner.
243. See supra note 6. This trend has not been confined to fourth amendment
situations. As Judge White has observed, the "Court [has] considerably
weakened the once absolute strictures of Miranda... ." State v. Favero, 213
Neb. 718, 724, 331 N.W.2d 259, 263 (1983) (one judge opinion). Compare, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (broad protections in custodial inter-
rogation) with Harris v. New York 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (otherwise reliable
statements obtained in violation of Miranda admissible for impeachment
purposes). Compare United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (right to
counsel at pretrial lineup) with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (no right
to counsel at preindictment lineup). One observer has noted:
[iut is assumed that the state supreme court judges, like the com-
mentators, saw the apparent handwriting on the wall and anticipated
a continuous chipping away at the Miranda principles by the Burger
Court. It is hypothesized that these judges took the opportunity to
erode the Miranda principles and, in fact, eroded them even more
than the Burger Court had already done.
Gruhl, State Supreme Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court's Post Miranda Rul-




The manner in which one reacts to these developments tends,
however, to be a philosophical rather than a strictly legal matter.245
Few, if any, would argue that felons should be immune from the
consequences of their actions.246 Nevertheless, it has been a fun-
damental premise of our system of justice that one accused of a
crime is considered innocent until proven guilty "beyond a reason-
able doubt," and that the vast resources and pressures of our sys-
tem of justice must not be brought to bear in an unfair or arbitrary
manner. As Mr. Justice Brandeis once observed:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen. In a government of laws, the existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the ad-
ministration of the criminal law the end justifies the means . . . would
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this Court
should resolutely set its face.
2 4 7
244. It has been argued that the fourth amendment doctrines adopted by the Bur-
ger Court are actively hostile to the rights of a criminal suspect. See generally
supra note 24 and the articles cited therein. After examining the Court's
treatment of the exclusionary rule, one commentator observed:
The foregoing analysis obviously raises serious questions about the
Burger Court's apparent lack of candor regarding its underlying
motivations in fourth amendment cases. It is no coincidence, it may
be argued, that all fourth amendment doctrinal inconsistencies sur-
veyed in this Article invariably result in applications of exclusionary
doctrine beneficial to the state and detrimental to the accused.
Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an
Inconsistent Exclusionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 191 (1979).
245. For example, compare the statement that "[tihe unjustified acquittals of
guilty defendants due to application of the exclusionary rule have resulted in
a growing sense of concern by our citizens that our system of justice is lack-
ing in sense and fairness," Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restatement of the
Exclusionary Rule, 73 J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916, 929 (1982), with Profes-
sor Schlag's assertion that "good faith type tests are nothing more than epis-
tomological artifice." Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionary Rule: Good Faith
Limitations and Damages Remedies, 73 J. CRnui. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 875, 914
(1982).
246. This sentiment should not, however, be confused with a willingness to char-
acterize fourth amendment standards as "procedural niceties" that should
yield to "a hard-minded concern for guilt or innocence of the defendant in the
dock." Yackle, supra note 6, at 430.
247. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
It was under the Warren Court that this doctrine found its first full expres-
sion. As Professor Yackle has observed:
There was a time when the Supreme Court understood its task. It
adopted a value-oriented model that permitted the fourth amend-
ment to speak to new threats not foreseen by the original draftsmen,
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Both the Nebraska Supreme Court and its federal counterpart
have made it clear that Article I, section 7, and the fourth amend-
ment provide protection only against unreasonable, searches and
seizures. Clearly, in warrant cases the determination that objec-
tive standards merit a finding of probable cause will meet this
threshold. Unfortunately, determinations of what is "reasonable"
are inherently subjective. Aguilar, Spinelli, and LeDent provided
a framework within which such decisions might be channeled.
Gates and Arnold have removed those guidelines. They have not,
however, eliminated the human tendency in criminal procedure to
color the discussion by the manner in which one reacts to the par-
ticular crime or criminal in question.
Rulings setting aside criminal convictions on the basis of official
misconduct are inevitably controversial. 248 The public demand for
criminal convictions, particularly in certain types of crimes, pro-
vides strong incentives for "overzealous officers" to violate the law.
The Court's attempt in Gates to argue for a revised standard be-
cause "police might well [otherwise] resort to warrantless
searches" 24 9 reflects this pressure. More importantly,- the Court's
apparent willingness to succumb to public insistence for convic-
tions in drug-related cases may well signal a willingness to lower
constitutional standards-not because it is appropriate, but be-
cause certain members of the Court have an aversion to a particu-
lar type of crime.25 0 The Court has recently emphasized, however,
that it is precisely the '"predictability of those pressures that
developed the principle of judicial supervision in order to control po-
lice discretion, and embraced the exclusionary rule to build into the
system a fundamental respect not only for the individual defendant's
constitutional rights but for the vicarious interests of all Americans.
Above all, the Court recognized that when it spoke in a search and
seizure case it spoke not only for the litigants at bar but for the pub-
lic at large.
Yackle, supra note 6, at 436-37.
248. Professor Kaplan, for example, has argued that "[iut is possible that the real
problem with the exclusionary rule is that it flaunts before us the price we
pay for the Fourth Amendment." J. KAPLAN, CRImNAL JUSTICE 208 (1973).
249. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561-62 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the obstacles to detection of drug traffic are im-
mense and should be accounted for). Justice Powell's implicit call for height-
ened scrutiny in drug cases appears to indicate a willingness to reduce the
level of constitutional scrutiny when such cases are before the Court. Prose-
cutors have apparently responded to this invitation. Each of the search and
seizure cases in which the court issued a ruling during its last Term were
drug related, and each involved an appeal of an adverse judgment below by
the state. See supra notes 185 & 12. This phenomenon is not confined to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Professor Snowden has, for example, documented a
similar antipathy toward the rights of defendants in "dope" cases in Ne-
braska. Snowden, supra note 185, at 361-76.
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makes imperative a resolute loyalty to the guarantees that the
Constitution extends to us all."
'25 1
This tension between two generally opposing camps will almost
certainly persist whether the standard applied is that of a United
States Supreme Court bent upon broadening the range of toler-
ated official conduct, or of a Nebraska Supreme Court seeking to
strengthen the constitutional defenses available to the citizens of
this State. It is doubtful that those on either side of the line, if
indeed the line can even be clearly drawn, will ever be inclined to
accede to the arguments of their opponents. Nevertheless, the
spectre of a less tolerant system of justice should concern us all.
This will be all the more so if the impetus for change is in large
part responsive to the viscera of those opposed to "crime," rather
than to a reasoned examination of the extent to which this society
is willing to tolerate the occasional release of a felon in order to
protect the liberties of all citizens.
Recent decisions by the Burger Court, and in particular Gates,
make it apparent that the Court wishes to reassess and, in most
instances, restrict both the substantive and procedural guarantees
developed by its predecessor. This being the case, those whose re-
sponsibility it is to shape the law in Nebraska would be well ad-
vised to recall the details of the era that preceeded the
development of modern criminal procedure standards. It was an
era within which federal constitutional guarantees were unavaila-
ble to criminal defendants in state proceedings, and comparable
state constitutional provisions carried little force.2 52 During that
time police could, for example, utilize physical and psychological
intimidation as substitutes for "interrogation."2 3 Many criminal
defendants had little, if any hope of legal assistance.254 The right
to trial by an impartial jury was inconsistently afforded,255 safe-
guards against compulsory self-incrimination were minimal, 25 6
protections against double jeopardy generally unavailable, 25 7 and
the right to confront witnesses only sporadically guaranteed.258
It was, then, a period during which the devil that lurks within us
was very close to the surface, and there were few, if any, trees
251. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 (1977).
252. For example, see supra note 22, the State of Nebraska refused to adopt the
exclusionary rule until forced to do so by Mapp. During this same time pe-
riod, the independent and parallel guarantees of the Nebraska Constitution,
see, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 12, & 13, provided no relief.
253. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
254. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
255. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
256. Mallow v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
257. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
258. Painter v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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upon the Nebraska legal landscape within whose shade we could
seek even a modicum of shelter. Dare we risk a return?
Mark R. Killenbeck, '85
